Internet Application Censorship: Studies of Weibo in China and Twitter in Turkey

Dan S. Wallach, Rice University

Today, two short studies

Weibo: at one point China's largest social network.

Twitter: broadly used worldwide, particularly popular in the Middle East.

We're looking at web applications, not at networks or the "Great Firewall of China".

The Velocity of Censorship: High-Fidelity Detection of Microblog Post Deletions

Tao Zhu, Independent Researcher
David Phipps, Bowdoin College
Adam Pridgen, Rice University
Jedidiah R. Crandall, University of New Mexico
Dan S. Wallach, Rice University

Microblogging sites in China




Sina Weibo

- ●503 million registered users as of Dec 2012.
 - o More than half are from mobile devices.

 About 100 million messages are posted each day on Sina Weibo.

Promote visibility of social issues.

Weibo's influence: Wukan incident - 2011



乌坎 (The village name) vs 乌坎 (Neologism)

Sina Weibo

Strict controls over the posts.



government's plans.

By Tom Simonite on April 29, 2013

What gets removed from China's social networks shows how

censorship strategies are advancing, and can even hint at the

sitive. A new academic study

researchers at Rice University, rsity of Mexico, and the or Tao Zhu wrote, "5% of the

deletions [of controversial posts] happened in the first S

Introduction of our research

 Detecting a censorship event within 1-2 minutes of its occurrence.

 Three strategies Weibo system uses to target sensitive content quickly.

Methodology

1.Identifying the sensitive user group

2. Crawling posts of sensitive user groups

3. Detecting deletions

Identifying the sensitive user group


 Use outdated sensitive keywords from China Digital Times

帰	中国	数字!	时代	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *				:	
三	CHIN	A DIGIT	TAL TI	ME	S				f L g⁺ล
	1		第一次测试日期/结果		第二次测试日期/结果		第三次测试日期/结果		第四次测试日期
敏感词	Sensitive Word	CDT English Post	Date/Result of	Test 1	Date/Result of	Test 2	Date/Result of	Test 3	Date/Result of
薄+刘	Bo+Liu	http://goo.gl/xxKoSY	2013.7.25	1					
薄+死	Bo+death	http://goo.gl/xxKoSY	2013.7.25	1					
薄+保外就医	Bo+medical parole	http://goo.gl/xxKoSY	2013.7.25	1					
薄+(周)永康	Bo+(Zhou) Yongkang	http://goo.gl/xxKoSY	2013.7.25	1					
薄王	Bo Wang	http://goo.gl/xxKoSY	2013.7.25	1					
薄胡	Bo Hu	http://goo.gl/xxKoSY	2013.7.25	1					
五个重庆	Five Chongqings	http://goo.gl/xxKoSY	2013.7.25	1					
党内斗争	internal Party struggle	http://goo.gl/xxKoSY	2013.7.25	1					
挺薄	support Bo	http://goo.gl/xxKoSY	2013.7.25	1					
薄公	Master Bo	http://goo.gl/xxKoSY	2013.7.25	1					
怀念+薄	think fondly of+Bo	http://goo.gl/xxKoSY	2013.7.25	1					
南华(早报)+马云	South China (Morning Post)+Jack Ma	http://goo.gl/mm0Ja	2013.7.20	1					

Identifying the sensitive user group

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 - Use outdated sensitive keywords from China Digital Times.

Start with 25 sensitive users.




Identifying the sensitive user group

- Identifying the sensitive user group
 - Use outdated sensitive keywords from China Digital Times.
 - Start with 25 sensitive users.
 - Sensitive group reaches 3,567 users after 15 days.
 - More than 4,500 deletion daily

Crawling

User timeline:

- Weibo user timeline API returns the most recent 50 posts of the specified user.
- Query 3,567 sensitive users once per minute
 - 100 accounts for API call
 - 300 concurrent Tor circuits.
- Four-node cluster running Hadoop and Hbase
 - 2.38 million posts from July 20 to September 8, 2012.



The lifetime of deleted Post = tn - t0

我们周围聪明人真多。左看专家,右观学者,上产公知,下聚五毛,左派右派,粪青愤中无处不在。不批评指责,不上岗上线会觉得自己毫无观点。站左,右边骂。靠右,左边怒。站中,两边骂。你讲啥不重要,别人如何解读你最关键,反正是错!养了几盆花就当园艺专家,看了点网络传闻就开始评点世界走向:)




- Permission-denied or system deletion
 - o "Permission denied" error.
 - Caused by censorship events.
 - The post still exists but cannot be accessed by users.

General deletion

- "Post does not exist" error.
- May caused by user self deletion or censorship events.
- The post does not exist.

2.38 Million user timeline posts



Permission-denied deletion or system deletion


Around 1,500 permission denied deletions.

 Comparing with WeiboScope, which is tracking around 300,000 users and have no more than 100 permission denied deletions daily.

Distribution of deleted posts



First two hours



Strategies to target sensitive contents

- 1. Weibo has filtering mechanisms as a proactive, automated defense.
- 2. Weibo targets specific users, such as those who frequently post sensitive content.
- 3. When a sensitive post is found, a moderator will use automated searching tools to find all of its related reposts, and delete them all at once.

1. Keywords list filtering

 Weibo has filtering mechanisms as a proactive automated defense

Sorry, The content violates the relevant laws and regulations. If need help, please contact customer service.



1. Keywords list filtering

 Weibo has filter proactive, auton

- Explicit filtering
- Implicit filtering

Your post has been submitted successfully. Currently, there is a delay caused by server data synchronization. Please wait for 1 to 2 minutes. Thank you very much.




1. Keywords list filtering

- Weibo has filtering mechanisms as a proactive, automated defense
 - Explicit filtering
 - Implicit filtering
 - Camouflaged posts
 - O Surveillance keywords list?
 - If no such list the cost will be too expansive


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


3. Finding all related reposts


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
Censors work in the night




Censors catch up in the morning



Conclusion




First two hours



Known Unknowns: An Analysis of Twitter Censorship in #Turkey

Rima Tanash, Rice University
Zhouhan Chen, Rice University
Tanmay Thakur, University of Houston
Chris Bronk, University of Houston
Devika Subramanian, Rice University
Dan S. Wallach, Rice University




Disclaimer

- Our research is focused on quantifying the extent of Twitter censorship in a given country.
- We do not disclose private user information, or share Twitter datasets.

Motivation

- Social media played a significant role during the recent wave of uprisings in the Middle East (a.k.a. Arab Spring)
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Government censorship

 Clearly, governments have great interest in controlling social media.

Government censorship in the news



EXCLUSIVE: Egypt Begins Surveillance Of Facebook, Twitter, And Skype On Unprecedented Scale

"We are looking at any conversation, any interaction, we might find worrying or would want to keep a closer eye on." Sheera Frenkel reports from Jerusalem and Maged Atef from Cairo for BuzzFeed News.

posted on Sept. 17, 2014, at 11:20 a.m.

WORLD



Types of censorship

Network level:

- Block entire service.
- China blocks western social media.
- Turkey blocks Twitter March, 2014.

Application level:

- Service is not blocked, censorship is internal to the service
- Example: Sina Weibo (Zhu et. al) keyword filtering, etc.

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- But what about application censorship in western social media?


Twitter censorship

January 2012, Twitter "Country-Withheld Content"


Twitter publishes censorship requests on ChillingEffects.org

Twitter publishes bi-annual transparency reports


Removal requests



Removal requests USA



Removal requests Turkey



This map raises many question

- What's up with Turkey?
- Why are there 0 requests from Arabic-speaking countries such as Saudi and UAE?
 - They have reputation for censorship.
 - Twitter is very popular in these countries.

Are Twitter transparency reports complete?

- "NOTE: The data in these reports is as accurate as possible, but may not be 100% comprehensive."
- Twitter does not post the notices to Chilling Effects when they "... are legally prohibited from doing so"

Prohibited by whom? And which laws?

Request sample from Chilling Effects

T.C.

talebinde bulunmustur.

ANKARA 1. SULH CEZA HÂKIMLIĞİ DEĞİSİK İS KARAR : 2014/2759 D.Is DEĞİŞİK İŞ NO HAKIM KATİP TALEP EDEN VEKILI : www.twitter.com KARŞI TARAF : 13/08/2014 TALEP TARIHI Talep eden vekilinin tevzi sonucu hakimliğimize gönderilen dilekçesi okundu. GEREĞİ DÜŞÜNÜLDÜ: 13/08/2014 tarihli vekili Talep eden dilekçesi ile sitesinde adlı internet https://www.twitter.com https://twitter.com/EmelTurangil/status/497773665489281024 sayılı URL adresinde müvekkilinin kişilik haklarının ihlal edildiğinden bahisle erişimin engellenmesi

(Redactions by Twitter.)

Why Turkey?

• It represents the darkest blob on the map.



Turkey banned Twitter, in its entirely, in 2014.

Research Questions

- Can we confirm the number of withheld tweets reported for Turkey in the Transparency Reports?
- Can we find unreported tweets in Turkey?
- Can we extract and analyze topics being withheld?

Agenda

- Methodology
 - Validating censored tweets
 - Finding interesting users
 - Crawling
- Findings
- Topic analysis
- Bypassing censorship
- Future work



 View tweets from inside Turkey and check if they are invisible.



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 While analyzing a sample of known censored tweets, we observed a special field in the tweet structure, called:

```
"id_str" : "51707756700291...
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```

If this field is reliable, then we can crawl from home!

Validating our observation

Tor browser bundle with ExitNode {TR}.

Result:

- We confirmed that all tweets that contained the "withheld_in_countries" field, were indeed invisible in Turkey.
- Therefore, can crawl from USA. ✓



Crawling

- Goal: collect censored tweets and examine their content.
- Free Twitter public API.
- Start with 689 seed sensitive users:
 - Source: Chilling Effects website.
 - Spider-out in the social group for new users.
- API with geo bounding boxes of three major Turkish cities.
- Crawl historical users' timeline.



Revisiting collected tweets

- Methodology: Collect now, verify later
 - Censorship doesn't happen immediately
 - Inspect if "withheld_in_countries" field is present

Tradeoff: # users vs. time granularity

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Two orders of magnitude

 "NOTE: The data in these reports is as accurate as possible, but may not be 100% comprehensive."

It is indeed not 100% comprehensive nor accurate.

Deduplication

- Maybe Twitter reports censored copies as one event?
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Topic analysis

- Topic analysis is valuable for understanding the political aims of the Turkish censors.
- Term frequency—inverse document frequency (tf-idf) standard machine learning algorithm.
- We extracted the top 5 topics with 10 words for each topic.

Topic analysis

- Word: media, dishonest, freedom, anti-Semitic references, minister, etc.
- We can infer that strongly worded and vulgar political discussions are being targeted by Turkey's censorship authorities.

Turkish "topic"	English translation
do gan aydın medya ,serefsiz grubu medyası vatan hurriyet de gil köpe gi	Aydin Dogan (a person who owns the biggest media in Turkey) media dishonest group home freedom not dog
cort _sekerbank _sap_sik in hikayesi dikkat chp ibrahim karaca	Not meaningful: Sekerbank (a Turkish financial institution) attention in story Ibrahim Karaca (a Turkish name)
koç un vehbi o glu ın aydın rahmi do gan yahudi nahum	Vehbi Koç (a Turkish entrepreneur / philanthropist) son enlightened womb rising Jewish
elvan lütfi bakan bakanı ula stırma ttt aptal bi www adam	Lütfi Elvan (a Turkish government minister) stupid man minister transportation
davuto glu ahmet ba sbakan lan pic sikeyim yahudi gavat göt vatan	Ahmet Davutoglu (current Turkish prime minister) prime minister man bastard fuck Jewish pimp ass

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
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
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- How?
- VPN & Tor.

Users connecting to Tor in Turkey

- 1. Tor metric: Number of users connecting to Tor in Turkey daily.
- 2. Distribution of withheld tweet by month (log scale).






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Peaks:

- 1. 5/2013 Taksim square protest.
- 2. 3/2014 Twitter ban in Turkey.




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
- 1. 5/2013 Taksim square protest.
- 2. 3/2014 Twitter ban.
- 3. 11/2014 &12/2014: peak in "withheld content" censorship



The Tor Project - https://metrics.torproject.org/

- Turns out, it is even easier!
- Change the "Location" setting in the Twitter application to "USA" for example.

 We expect many users to start using this method in the future.



What if Twitter becomes vigilant?

Users will revert to VPNs or Tor.

Country level censorship is hard

• If "country withholding" mechanisms don't work, countries will demand global Twitter censorship

French data regulator rejects Google's right-to-be-forgotten appeal

Search engine's attempt to block French order to apply delistings to its google.com domain, not just its European sites, dismissed in ground-breaking case



Future work

- Measuring censorship in other countries.
 - Twitter imposes restrictive rate limits.

Political science collaboration ongoing.

Conclusion

- 1. We provided methods to find unpublished censored tweets
- 2. We showed that the size of censorship in Turkey is at least two orders of magnitude larger than what Twitter reported.
- 3. We introduced a new simple method to bypass Twitter censorship by changing the location setting.
- 4. We extracted censored topics using machine learning clustering algorithm and found that most of censored topics are political.

FAQ's:

http://www.cs.rice.edu/~rst5/twitterTurkey/