



Botprobe - Reducing Network Threat Intelligence Big Data & Pre/Post Forensic Data

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project background

PhD: "a botnet needle in a virtual haystack"

- a mechanism to capture botnet communication traffic in virtualised environments such as Cloud Service Providers.

why?

- cloud providers are building block for IoT
- a great hosting platform for botnets

interesting built environment:


- tenant isolation, data privacy
- internal infrastructure is an attack surface


packet capture

if you want to capture network traffic for threat detection:

use wireshark/tcpdump et al










packet capture

Three drawbacks in this scenario:

- 1) port mirroring doubles
 network bandwidth volumes
- 2) assumes the monitored
 devices support mirroring
- 3) big fat pipe to send traffic to a 3rd party SOC





history lesson

1980's

Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)

- MIB information is limited, so use syslog
- Syslog is unstructured

1990's

- 1991 IETF proposed packet aggregation into flows
- 1993 Disbanded due to lack of interest
- 1996 Cisco patented NetFlow

continued...



history lesson


1996 - Cisco patented NetFlow

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flow aggregates similar traffic based on an attributes tuple:
    e.g. 5 field flow tuple: { sIP, dIP, sPort, dPort, protocol }
```

- PCAP is a phone call
- flow is the phone bill (who, when, how long)



flow export architecture





history lesson

```
1996 - Cisco patented NetFlow
2002 - NetFlow v5
2004 - NetFlow v9
```

NetFlow was designed for application to **network management**, but has limitations when applied to **threat detection**:

- NFv5 has 18 fixed fields (only 10 useful!)
- header information ONLY
- transport layer is UDP only
- no support for: MPLS, IPv6, VLANs, MAC addresses
- [typically 1:50 sampling rates]

Cisco NFv9 supports (most) of these, but is proprietary.

IP Flow Information eXport

2013 - IPFIX the flow export standard (RFC7011 - RFC7015)

IPFIX IS A FLOW EXPORT PROTOCOL IN ITS OWN RIGHT (not NFv10)

» Standards-based: vendor neutrality

» Extensible: NFv5 - fixed template: 18 fields

NFv9 - 79 fields (104 if Cisco)

IPFIX - 433 Information Elements (IANA)


» EEs create your own bespoke Enterprise Elements

» Security: security by design

» Future-proof: supports IPv6, MPLS and multi-cast




botprobe template









pcap botprobe data volumes: 99.4 MB 3.0 MB load/analysis: 172.5 sec 0.2 sec

botnet detection

repeated 30 botnet experiments:

- » 97% less capture data volume
- » faster capture
- » no change to algorithm feeds



		Gates, et al.	BLINC Karagiannis, et al.	Karasaridis, et al.	RISHI Goebel & Hottz	BOTHUNTER Gu, et al.	BOTSNIFFER Gu, et al.	BOTMINER Gu, et al.	Strayer, et al.	BOTLAB John, et al.	Wurzinger, et al.
Publication Year		2004	2005	2007	2007	2007	2008	2008	2008	2009	2009
IRC, HTTP, P2P		-	Р	1	1	1	ĻН	I,H,P	1	Н	I,H,P
P = Packet Capture 5 = NFv5, 9 = NFv9		5	5	5, P	Р	Р	Р	5, P	5	-	Р
NFv5 Attributes	srcIPv4	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
	dstlPv4	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
	srcPort	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
	dstPort	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
	proto	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
	packetTotal	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓		✓
	byteTotal	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓		✓
	TCPFlag	✓		✓		✓	✓		✓		
	timeStamp	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Non-NFv5 Attributes	flowDirection		✓					✓			
	flowsTotal			✓							
	1stPacketSize										
	payloadSize										✓
	irc_Header			✓	✓	✓	✓				
	http_URL				✓		✓			✓	✓
	http_UserAgent										✓
	http_Server										
	http_Response										
	smtp							✓		✓	✓
	dns							✓		✓	





PCAP	IPFIX	so what?			
SPAN mirroring	Inline TAP	mirroring doubles network bandwidth, TAP is more efficient			
dedicated infrastructure	s/w probe on any device	more control over data capture, lower data volumes			
plain Text	encryption, replay protection	security by design, can be sent over internet			
unstructured data	structured data	easier search			
TB data volumes	MB data volumes	97% reduction data volumes			
full packet: payload	L3/L7 templates- capture	privacy, lawful inspection.			



case studies


further IPFIX templates:

- botprobe : botnets
- smtpprobe : spam traffic
- httpprobe : malicious http streams
- iotprobe : malicious IoT traffic
- icsprobe : malicious Industrial Control Systems traffic

if an attribute is present in a packet [header or payload], we can capture it.

ipfix capture






- software probes
- end-point protection
- increased visibility for fewer probes
- lower capture volumes



adaptive capture



machine learning genetic algorithms for realtime template

adaption as traffic profiles change.



threat detection

three key phases of a cyber attack:

- infection
- detection
- response


average time to detect a cyberattack is 205 days (Gartner, 2016)

the cost of a cyber attack is reputational, not just financial.




big data challenge

Network Big Data





big data challenge



97% reduction in threat
intel. data volumes

- 1) SOC team reacts faster
 to cyberattacks
- 2) protecting business assets
 and reputation



new opportunities

template extensibility + big data reduction =

- automated mitigation
- legal interception
- pre-event forensics
- pcap indexing [flow indexing]
- new detection algorithms [not just for botnets]



we need you...

if you are interested in collaboration, We'd love to talk with you:

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