CONTRAST SECURITY

SECURITY OBSERVABILITY 101: THINKING INSIDE THE BOX!

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@PLANETLEVEL

OWASP CHARLOTTE – OCT 2021

REAL WORLD APPSEC FACTS FROM LAST 12 MONTHS…

VULNERABILITY FACTS

- 96% of applications have at least one vulnerability
- The average software project introduces 2-3 new vulnerabilities every month
- The average application has 30+ vulnerabilities and 2+ high or critical flaws in open source libraries
- Average application codebase:
  - 20% is custom code
  - 6% is OSS that actually runs
  - 74% is never used
- Only 14% of libraries are the latest version

Contrast 2021
AppSec Observability Report

ATTACK FACTS

- The average application is attacked over 13,000 times a month
- Zero applications were not attacked every single month
- 99% of attacks do not connect with their intended vulnerability
- Attacks on all vulnerabilities are trending up over the last 12 months



INSTRUMENTATION CHANGES EVERYTHING

INSTRUMENTATION IS EASY



ADD IN SENSORS TO REVEAL SECURITY

WIN!



USE INSTRUMENTATION TO DEFINE SENSORS THAT MAKE SOFTWARE BEHAVIOR OBSERVABLE

INSTRUMENTATION PROVIDES CONTINUOUS ACCURATE REALTIME TELEMETRY

"RUNTIME REALITY" FULLY ASSEMBLED AND RUNNING APPS/APIS ARE THE ONLY SOURCE OF TRUTH

THE JAVA OBSERVABILITY TOOLKIT (JOT)

FREE OPEN SOURCE INSTRUMENTATION



https://github.com/planetlevel/jot

RIDICULOUSLY SIMPLE EXAMPLE: WEAK SQL QUERIES

```
sensors:

- name: "get-unsafe-queries"
  description: "Identifies unparameterized database queries"
  methods:
  - "java.sql.Statement.execute"
  - "java.sql.Statement.addBatch"
  - "java.sql.Statement.executeQuery"
  - "java.sql.Statement.executeUpdate"
  excludes:
  - "java.sql.PreparedStatement"   # not vulnerable subclass
  captures:
  - "#ARGS"
```

```
$ export JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS="-javaagent:jot-0.9.jar=rules/usql.jot"
```

```
  [JOT get-unsafe-queries] com.acme.ticketbook.Database.updateUnsaf
e(Database.java:173) [INSERT INTO tickets(name,city,cc,ticket) VALU
ES('Arshan Dabirsiaghi', 'Baltimore', '/j7B2e388H3GVMJNNTVRMXD2JAYE
f+76', '10002')]
  [JOT get-unsafe-queries] com.acme.ticketbook.Database.updateUnsaf
e(Database.java:173) [INSERT INTO tickets(name,city,cc,ticket) VALU
ES('Harold McGinnis', 'Philadelphia', 'uWtJbTHcGaGF/bvouf9w5WcVwSqa
2Avr', '10003')]
  [JOT get-unsafe-queries] com.acme.ticketbook.Database.updateUnsaf
e(Database.java:173) [INSERT INTO tickets(name,city,cc,ticket) VALU
ES('Chris Schmidt', 'Denver', 'JFEu+fcb7lwvRJ3KX1DDOWrsqmPDrPvn', '
10004')]
  [JOT get-unsafe-queries] com.acme.ticketbook.Database.queryUnsafe
(Database.java:151) [SELECT * FROM tickets]


TRACE-10004(1)
  [JOT get-unsafe-queries] com.acme.ticketbook.Database.queryUnsafe
(Database.java:151) [SELECT * FROM tickets]


TRACE-10006(1)
  [JOT get-unsafe-queries] com.acme.ticketbook.Database.queryUnsafe
(Database.java:151) [SELECT * FROM tickets WHERE ticket='JOT FTW']
```

WHAT ENCRYPTION IS HAPPENING?

```
sensors:

 - name: "get-ciphers"
   description: "Identifies encryption ciphers"
   methods:
   - "javax.crypto.Cipher.getInstance"
   captures:
   - "#P0"

reports:
 - name: "Encryption Usage"
   type: "list"
   cols: "get-ciphers"
```

In JOT, a “capture” is a “spring expression” (SPEL) that allows you to extract data using references to objects in the running app/API.

- #P0 is the first parameter to the method
- #OBJ is the object itself
- #RET is the return value from the method

You can call methods on these references!!!

```
$ export JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS="-javaagent:jot-0.9.1.jar=jots/ciphers.jot"
```

Encryption Usage	get-ciphers
com.acme.ticketbook.Ticket.encrypt(Ticket.java:125)	DES
java.base/sun.security.ssl.SSLCipher$T13GcmReadCipherGenerator$GcmReadCipher.<init>(SSLCipher.java:1858)	AES/GCM/NoPadding
java.base/sun.security.ssl.SSLCipher$T13GcmWriteCipherGenerator$GcmWriteCipher.<init>(SSLCipher.java:201	AES/GCM/NoPadding
java.base/sun.security.ssl.SSLCipher.isTransformationAvailable(SSLCipher.java:510)	AES/CBC/NoPadding,AES/GCM/
org.apache.jsp.accessA_jsp._jspService(accessA_jsp.java:212)	AES
org.apache.jsp.accessA_jsp._jspService(accessA_jsp.java:213)	PBEWithMD5AndTripleDES
org.apache.jsp.accessB_jsp._jspService(accessB_jsp.java:212)	DES
org.apache.jsp.accessC_jsp._jspService(accessC_jsp.java:212)	DES/CBC/PKCS5Padding
org.apache.jsp.accessE_jsp._jspService(accessE_jsp.java:212)	DESede
org.apache.jsp.accessE_jsp._jspService(accessE_jsp.java:213)	AES

```
sensors:

- name: "get-routes"
  description: "Identifies the route for this HTTP request"
  methods:
  - "javax.servlet.Servlet.service"
  captures:
  - "#P0.getRequestURI()"

- name: "get-users"
  description: "Identifies user names"
  methods:
  - "javax.servlet.Servlet.service"
  captures:
  - "#P0.getRemoteUser() ?: \"Guest\""

- name: "get-role"
  description: "Identifies roles"
  methods:
  - "javax.servlet.ServletRequest.isUserInRole"
  captures:
  - "#P0"


reports:

 - name: "Test Coverage Matrix"
   type: "compare"
   rows: "get-routes"
   cols: "get-users"

 - name: "Access Control Matrix"
   type: "compare"
   rows: "get-routes"
   cols: "get-role"
```

VERIFYING ACCESS CONTROL?

```
$ export JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS="-javaagent:jot-0.9.1.jar=jots/access.jot"
```

Test Coverage Matrix	Guest	UserB	UserC	UserD	UserE
/ticketbook/accessA.jsp	X	X		X	X
/ticketbook/accessB.jsp	X	X	X	X	
/ticketbook/accessC.jsp	X	X		X	
/ticketbook/accessD.jsp	X	X		X	X
/ticketbook/accessE.jsp	X				X
/ticketbook/architecture.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/cmd.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/forward.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/hash.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/redirect.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/xss.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/xxe.jsp	X				

Access Control Matrix	RoleA	RoleB	RoleC	RoleD	RoleE
/ticketbook/accessA.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/accessB.jsp		X			
/ticketbook/accessC.jsp			X		
/ticketbook/accessE.jsp	X			X	X

CHEATING AT PENTESTS FOR FUN AND PROFIT



SQL Injection



EL Injection



Command Injection

COMMUNICATING SECURITY VIA TEST FAILURES

```
sensors:

- name: "ban-command-injection"
  description: "Fails any JUnit tests that cause banned methods to be invoked"
  methods:
  - "java.lang.ProcessBuilder.<init>"
  scopes:
  - "org.junit.platform.commons.util.ReflectionUtils.invokeMethod"
  exception: "To prevent command injection, Acme Corp security standard 27B/6 restricts the use
 of operating system commands from within web applications. Please find a safer way to achieve
your goal. Contact security@acme.com for help."
```

Define this “scope” and add an exception. Now your normal test cases fail for security reasons if your sensor fires!

```
[INFO] -------------------------------------------------------
[INFO]  T E S T S
[INFO] -------------------------------------------------------
[INFO] Running com.example.project.CalculatorTests
[ERROR] Tests run: 6, Failures: 0, Errors: 1, Skipped: 0, Time elapsed: 0.155 s <<< FAILURE! -
in com.example.project.CalculatorTests
org.openolly.advice.SensorException: To prevent command injection, Acme Corp security standard
27B/6 restricts the use of operating system commands from within web applications. Please find
a safer way to achieve your goal. Contact security@acme.com for help.
        at com.example.project.CalculatorTests.executeRuntime(CalculatorTests.java:33)
```

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/developer-friendly-security-reporting-jeff-williams

```
sensors:

- name: "get-routes"
  description: "Identifies the route for this HTTP r
  methods:
  - "javax.servlet.Servlet.service"
  captures:
  - "#P0.getRequestURI()"

- name: "sandbox-expressions"
  description: "Prevents harmful methods from being
  methods:
  - "java.lang.ProcessBuilder.<init>"
  - "java.io.Socket.<init>"
  scopes:
  - "javax.el.ValueExpression.getValue"
  captures:
  - "#P0"
  exception: "Attempt to escape expression language

reports:

- name: "Expression Language Injection Attempt Log"
  type: "series"
  rows: "get-routes"
  cols: "sandbox-expressions:13"
```

HOW CAN I PREVENT EXPRESSION LANGUAGE INJECTION FROM BEING EXPLOITED?



Runtime Protection!

IAST

Interactive Application Security Testing is simply using instrumentation to detect vulnerabilities.
USE IT IN DEVELOPMENT.



Vulnerability Confirmed

RASP

Runtime Application Self-Protection is simply using instrumentation to detect attacks and prevent exploits.
USE IT IN PRODUCTION



Exploit Prevented

THE MOVE TO MODERN

SOFTWARE SECURITY

LEGACY

SCAN AND FIREWALL MODEL

- Disruptive, bottleneck
- Can’t keep up, even with army of experts
- After the fact, inaccurate
- Snapshot in time
- Tool soup, security silos

MODERN

EMBEDDED MODEL

- Embedded, works in flow, frictionless
- Force multiplier, no experts required
- Direct observation, instant feedback
- Continuous, always-on
- One platform across dev, sec, ops

SECURITY OBSERVABILITY ACCELERATES INNOVATION

SECURITY
OBSERVABILITY
(INSIDE - OUT)



Instant
Feedback

Vulnerabilities

Attacks

Instrumentation
(IAST, SCA, RASP)

CUSTOM CODE
LIBRARIES
FRAMEWORKS
APP SERVER
RUNTIME

DEV
TEST
STAGE
PROD

CI/CD

Continuous automated security testing
and exploit prevention

Self-
Testing

Self-
Protecting

FLOW
BUSINESS VALUE
+
CONTINUOUS
ASSURANCE



OBSERVABILITY YIELDS A

17X

IMPROVEMENT IN MTTR OVER SCANNING



https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-vulnerability-jeff-williams

CONTRAST SECURITY

“Making Security in a Software Factory”

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/making-security-software-factory-jeff-williams/

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ASK ME ANYTHING

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