




HOW TO BUILD AWESOME SECURITY INSTRUMENTATION TO AUTOMATE APPSEC TESTING AND PROTECTION

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THE GOAL IS SIMPLE:

DELIVER VALUE
TO CUSTOMERS,
FASTER



MAJOR INITIATIVES:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> SECURITY MODERNIZATION | <input type="checkbox"/> LEGACY TOOL REVIEW |
| <input type="checkbox"/> DEVOPS MANDATE | <input type="checkbox"/> BREACH PREVENTION |
| <input type="checkbox"/> DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION | <input type="checkbox"/> AUTOMATION INITIATIVES |

DEVELOPMENT'S RESPONSE:


FLOW | FEEDBACK | CONTINUOUS EXPERIMENTATION & LEARNING



- ▷ CLOUD
- ▷ CONTAINERS
- ▷ MICROSERVICES / API'S
- ▷ OPEN SOURCE
- ▷ CI/CD



MANUAL
PROCESSES
(I.E. SCAN & TRIAGE)




WHY NOT?

ANALYSIS
~~200X MORE FREQUENT DEPLOYS~~
REMEDiation
~~24X FASTER RECOVERY TIMES~~
SECURITY BACKLOG
~~3X LOWER CHANGE FAILURE RATE~~
SECURE
~~10X AMOUNT OF CODE~~

SECURITY'S CHALLENGE:

HOW DO YOU SECURE MODERN SOFTWARE WITH LEGACY TOOLS?




LEGACY OUTCOMES:

1. SECURITY SLOWS VALUE DELIVERY STREAM
2. DEVELOPMENT BYPASSES SECURITY & RELEASE INSECURE CODE
3. RUN SECURITY ASYNCHRONOUS TO SDLC AS A COMPLIANCE CHECK


MODERN SECURITY CAN BE MORE!




IS IT
WORKING
YET?



2002



2019




DEVSECOPS IS ABOUT CHANGING *SECURITY* NOT *DEVOPS*

DEVOPS

1. Establish work flow
(Business) (Customer)
Dev → Ops
2. Ensure instant feedback
Dev ↔ Ops
3. Culture of experimentation
Dev ↔ Ops

DEVSECOPS


1. Establish security work flow
(Business) (Customer)
Dev → Ops
2. Ensure instant security feedback
Dev ↔ Ops
3. Build a security culture
Dev ↔ Ops



INSTRUMENTATION CHANGES EVERYTHING



WHAT IS SECURITY INSTRUMENTATION?



1. SECURITY TESTING WITH INSTRUMENTATION

UnsafeSQLAgent.java

```
1 package com.contrastsecurity;
2
3 import static net.bytebuddy.matcher.ElementMatchers.*;
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 public class UnsafeSQLAgent {
11
12     public static void premain(String arg, Instrumentation inst) throws Exception {
13         System.out.println( "UnsafeSQLAgent installed" );
14         new AgentBuilder.Default()
15             .ignore(none())
16             .type(hasGenericSuperType(named("java.sql.Statement")))
17             .transform((b, td, cl, m) -> b.visit(Advice.to(SecurityAdvice.class)
18                 .on(named("execute").or(named("executeQuery")))))
19             .installOn(inst);
20     }
21
22     public static class SecurityAdvice {
23         @Advice.OnMethodExit
24         public static void exit(@Advice.Argument(0) Object p) throws Exception {
25             System.out.println( "WARNING: Unparameterized SQL -> " + p );
26             new Throwable().printStackTrace();
27         }
28     }
29 }
30
```

Put SecurityAdvice inside
Statement.execute


Report rule violation when
it happens

DEMO: TESTING FOR SQL INJECTION

```
Terminal — java -Djava.util.logging.config.file=/Users/jeffwilliams/git/apache-tomcat-8.5.43/conf/logging.properties -Djava.util.logging.manager=org.apache...
Usage of interface net.bytebuddy.asm.Advice$Return
Jeff's-MacBook-Pro:apache-tomcat-8.5.43 jeffwilliams$ export JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS="-javaagent:/Users/jeffwilliams/eclipse-workspace/UnsafeSQL/target/unsafe-sql-0.9-jar-with-dependencies.jar"
Jeff's-MacBook-Pro:apache-tomcat-8.5.43 jeffwilliams$
Jeff's-MacBook-Pro:apache-tomcat-8.5.43 jeffwilliams$ bin/catalina.sh run
Using CATALINA_BASE:   /Users/jeffwilliams/git/apache-tomcat-8.5.43
Using CATALINA_HOME:   /Users/jeffwilliams/git/apache-tomcat-8.5.43
Using CATALINA_TMPDIR: /Users/jeffwilliams/git/apache-tomcat-8.5.43/temp
Using JRE_HOME:        /Library/Java/JavaVirtualMachines/jdk1.8.0_211.jdk/Contents/Home
Using CLASSPATH:       /Users/jeffwilliams/git/apache-tomcat-8.5.43/bin/bootstrap.jar:/Users/jeffwilliams/git/apache-tomcat-8.5.43/bin/tomcat-juli.jar
Picked up JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS: -javaagent:/Users/jeffwilliams/eclipse-workspace/UnsafeSQL/target/unsafe-sql-0.9-jar-with-dependencies.jar
UnsafeSQLAgent installed
16-Mar-2020 14:03:48.472 INFO [main] org.apache.catalina.startup.VersionLoggerListener.log Server version:      Apache Tomcat/8.5.43
16-Mar-2020 14:03:48.474 INFO [main] org.apache.catalina.startup.VersionLoggerListener.log Server built:       Jul 4 2019 20:53:15 UTC
16-Mar-2020 14:03:48.474 INFO [main] org.apache.catalina.startup.VersionLoggerListener.log Server number:      8.5.43.0
16-Mar-2020 14:03:48.474 INFO [main] org.apache.catalina.startup.VersionLoggerListener.log OS Name:             Mac OS X
WARNING: Unparameterized SQL -> SELECT * FROM tickets WHERE ticket='10000'
java.lang.Throwable
    at org.hsqldb.jdbc.JDBCStatement.executeQuery(Unknown Source)
    at com.acme.ticketbook.Database.queryUnsafe(Database.java:151)
    at com.acme.ticketbook.Database.getTicket(Database.java:248)
    at com.acme.ticketbook.TicketService.get(TicketService.java:28)
    at org.apache.jsp.check_jsp._jspService(check_jsp.java:213)
    at org.apache.jsp._jspService(HttpServlet.java:70)
    at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:741)
```


Now your normal test cases fail for security reasons if you have a vulnerability!

TYPICAL “SCANNING” APPROACH



PROBLEMS WITH SPEED, SCALE, AND ACCURACY

TESTING WITH AN AGENT ON THE INSIDE!




```
cat rules/sqli.yaml
```

```
---
# Java Sensor Toolkit (JST)
# https://openo11y.org
```

```
sensors:
```

```
- name: "get-routes"
  description: "Identifies the route for this HTTP request"
  methods:
    - "javax.servlet.Servlet.service"
  captures:
    - "#P0.getRequestURI()"

- name: "get-unsafe-queries"
  description: "Identifies unparameterized database queries"
  methods:
    - "java.sql.Statement.execute"
    - "java.sql.Statement.addBatch"
    - "java.sql.Statement.executeQuery"
    - "java.sql.Statement.executeUpdate"
  excludes:
    - "java.sql.PreparedStatement" # not vulnerable
  captures:
    - "#ARGS"
```

```
reports:
```

```
- name: "SQLi"
  type: "series"
  rows: "get-routes"
  cols: "get-unsafe-queries:2"
```

DEMO:

“NO CODE” SECURITY OBSERVABILITY!

SQLi	Method Call	get-routes	get-unsafe-queries
10000	com.acme.ticketbook.Database.queryUnsafe(Database.java:151)	/ticketbook/list.jsp	[SELECT * FROM tickets]
10001	com.acme.ticketbook.Database.updateUnsafe(Database.java:173)	/ticketbook/request.jsp	[DROP TABLE tickets]
10002	com.acme.ticketbook.Database.updateUnsafe(Database.java:173)	/ticketbook/request.jsp	[CREATE TABLE tickets (id INTEGER IDENTITY,
10003	com.acme.ticketbook.Database.updateUnsafe(Database.java:173)	/ticketbook/request.jsp	[INSERT INTO tickets(name,city,cc,ticket) VA
10004	com.acme.ticketbook.Database.updateUnsafe(Database.java:173)	/ticketbook/request.jsp	[INSERT INTO tickets(name,city,cc,ticket) VA
10005	com.acme.ticketbook.Database.updateUnsafe(Database.java:173)	/ticketbook/request.jsp	[INSERT INTO tickets(name,city,cc,ticket) VA
10006	com.acme.ticketbook.Database.updateUnsafe(Database.java:173)	/ticketbook/request.jsp	[INSERT INTO tickets(name,city,cc,ticket) VA
10007	com.acme.ticketbook.Database.queryUnsafe(Database.java:151)	/ticketbook/request.jsp	[SELECT * FROM tickets]
10008	com.acme.ticketbook.Database.queryUnsafe(Database.java:151)	/ticketbook/check.jsp	[SELECT * FROM tickets WHERE ticket='10001']
10009	com.acme.ticketbook.Database.queryUnsafe(Database.java:151)	/ticketbook/check.jsp	[SELECT * FROM tickets WHERE ticket='1']
10010	com.acme.ticketbook.Database.queryUnsafe(Database.java:151)	/ticketbook/check.jsp	[SELECT * FROM tickets WHERE ticket='2']
10011	com.acme.ticketbook.Database.queryUnsafe(Database.java:151)	/ticketbook/check.jsp	[SELECT * FROM tickets WHERE ticket='3']

sensors:

- name: "get-routes"
description: "Identifies the route for this HTTP request"
methods:
 - "javax.servlet.Servlet.service"captures:
 - "#P0.getRequestURI()"
- name: "get-users"
description: "Identifies user names"
methods:
 - "javax.servlet.Servlet.service"captures:
 - "#P0.getRemoteUser() ?: \"Guest\""
- name: "get-role"
description: "Identifies roles"
methods:
 - "javax.servlet.ServletRequest.isUserInRole"captures:
 - "#P0"

reports:

- name: "Test Coverage Matrix"
type: "compare"
rows: "get-routes"
cols: "get-users"
- name: "Access Control Matrix"
type: "compare"
rows: "get-routes"
cols: "get-role"

DEMO:

TESTING ACCESS CONTROL!

Test Coverage Matrix	Guest	UserB	UserC	UserD	UserE
/ticketbook/accessA.jsp	X	X		X	X
/ticketbook/accessB.jsp	X	X	X	X	
/ticketbook/accessC.jsp	X	X		X	
/ticketbook/accessD.jsp	X	X		X	X
/ticketbook/accessE.jsp	X				X
/ticketbook/architecture.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/cmd.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/forward.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/hash.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/redirect.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/xss.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/xxe.jsp	X				
Access Control Matrix	RoleA	RoleB	RoleC	RoleD	RoleE
/ticketbook/accessA.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/accessB.jsp		X			
/ticketbook/accessC.jsp			X		
/ticketbook/accessE.jsp	X			X	X

DEMO:

MAKING SECURITY OBSERVABLE WITH INSTRUMENTATION

```
- name: "get-ciphers"
  description: "Identifies encryption ciphers"
  methods:
    - "javax.crypto.Cipher.getInstance"
  captures:
    - "#p0"
  matchers:
    - "!null"

- name: "native-libraries"
  description: "Identifies the use of native libraries"
  methods:
    - "java.lang.System.load"
    - "java.lang.System.loadLibrary"
    - "java.lang.System.mapLibraryName"
  captures:
    - "#p0"
  matchers:
    - "!null"

- name: "get-unsafe-queries"
  description: "Identifies unparameterized database queries"
  methods:
    - "java.sql.Statement.execute"
    - "java.sql.Statement.addBatch"
    - "java.sql.Statement.executeQuery"
    - "java.sql.Statement.executeUpdate"
  excludes:
    - "java.sql.PreparedStatement" #these calls are harmless in PreparedStatement
  captures:
    - "#ARGS"
```


Test Coverage Matrix	Guest	UserA	UserB	UserC	UserD	UserE
/ticketbook/accessA.jsp	X	X	X	X	X	X
/ticketbook/accessB.jsp	X	X				X
/ticketbook/accessC.jsp	X	X				X
/ticketbook/accessD.jsp	X	X				X
/ticketbook/accessE.jsp	X	X	X			X
/ticketbook/check.jsp						X
/ticketbook/list.jsp						X
/ticketbook/profile						X

Access Control Matrix	RoleA	RoleB	RoleC	RoleD	RoleE
/ticketbook/accessA.jsp	X				
/ticketbook/accessB.jsp		X			
/ticketbook/accessC.jsp			X		
/ticketbook/accessD.jsp					
/ticketbook/accessE.jsp	X			X	X
/ticketbook/check.jsp					
/ticketbook/list.jsp					
/ticketbook/profile					

Cipher Matrix	AES	DES	DES/CBC/PKCS5Padding	DESede	PBEWithMD5AndTripleDES
/ticketbook/accessA.jsp	X				X
/ticketbook/accessB.jsp		X			
/ticketbook/accessC.jsp				X	
/ticketbook/accessD.jsp					
/ticketbook/accessE.jsp	X			X	
/ticketbook/check.jsp		X			
/ticketbook/list.jsp		X			
/ticketbook/profile		X			

Query Matrix	Query
/ticketbook/check.jsp	SELECT * FROM tickets WHERE ticket='OWASP'
/ticketbook/list.jsp	SELECT * FROM tickets
/ticketbook/profile	INSERT INTO tickets(name,city,cc,ticket) VALUES('OWASP', 'Everywhere', '16/RPW701N3H9cJofut3ig==', '10006')

DEMO: MAKING SECURITY OBSERVABLE WITH INSTRUMENTATION

```
# Java Sensor Toolkit (JST)
# https://openo11y.org
```

```
sensors:
```

```
- name: "get-routes"
  description: "Identifies the route for this HTTP request"
  methods:
  - "javax.servlet.Servlet.service"
  captures:
  - "#P0.getRequestURI()"
```

```
- name: "block-native-process"
  description: "Blocks attempts to start native processes"
  methods:
  - "java.lang.ProcessBuilder.<init>"
  scopes:
  - "javax.servlet.Servlet.service"
  captures:
  - "#ARGS"
  exception: "Attempt to create ProcessBuilder from within Servlet.service() prevented by JST rule 'block-native-process'"
```


```
reports:
```

```
- name: "CMDi"
  type: "series"
  rows: "get-routes"
  cols: "block-native-process:13"
```

DEMO: PREVENTING COMMAND INJECTION EXPLOITS WITH INSTRUMENTATION!

DEMO: PREVENTING COMMAND INJECTION

Create accurate appsec
visibility in OPS



HTTP Status 500 – Internal Server Error

Type Exception Report

Message com.contrastsecurity.advice.SensorException: Attempt to create ProcessBuilder from within Servlet.service() prevented by JST rule 'block-native-process'

Description The server encountered an unexpected condition that prevented it from fulfilling the request.

Exception

```
org.apache.jasper.JasperException: com.contrastsecurity.advice.SensorException: Attempt to create ProcessBuilder from within Servlet.service() prevented by JST rule 'block-native-process'
    org.apache.jasper.servlet.JspServletWrapper.handleJspException(JspServletWrapper.java:156)
    org.apache.jasper.servlet.JspServletWrapper.service(JspServletWrapper.java:147)
    org.apache.jasper.servlet.JspServlet.serviceJspFile(JspServlet.java:387)
    org.apache.jasper.servlet.JspServlet.service(JspServlet.java:425)
    javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:741)
    org.apache.tomcat.websocket.server.WsFilter.doFilter(WsFilter.java:53)
```

Root Cause org.apache.coyote.AbstractProtocol.pause Pausing ProtocolHandler ["ajp-nio-8009"]

```
20-Apr-2020 12:34:43.750 INFO [localhost-startStop.1] org.apache.catalina.deploy.DirectoryDeploying web application dir
8.5.43/webapps/host-manager]
20-Apr-2020 12:34:43.762 WARNING [localhost-startStop.1] org.apache.catalina.core.SecurityConfig.validateSecurityRoles Security role name
being defined in a <security-role>
20-Apr-2020 12:34:43.767 INFO [localhost-startStop.1] org.apache.catalina.deploy.DirectoryDeployment of web application
cat-8.5.43/webapps/host-manager] has finished
20-Apr-2020 12:34:43.770 INFO [main] org.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngineHandler ["http-nio-8080"]
20-Apr-2020 12:34:43.780 INFO [main] org.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngineHandler ["ajp-nio-8009"]
20-Apr-2020 12:34:43.782 INFO [main] org.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngineHandler ["ajp-nio-8009"]
20-Apr-2020 15:01:24.893 INFO [Thread-5] org.apache.coyote.AbstractProtocol.pause Pausing ProtocolHandler ["ajp-nio-8009"]
```

sensors:

- name: "get-routes"
description: "Identifies the route for this HTTP request"
methods:
 - "javax.servlet.Servlet.service"captures:
 - "#P0.getRequestURI()"

- name: "sandbox-expressions"
description: "Prevents harmful methods from being used during expresssion evaluation"
methods:
 - "java.lang.ProcessBuilder.<init>"
 - "java.io.Socket.<init>"scopes:
 - "javax.el.ValueExpression.getValue"captures:
 - "#P0"exception: "Attempt to escape expression language sandbox prevented by JST rule 'sandbox-expressions'"

reports:

- name: "Expression Language Injection Attempt Log"
type: "series"
rows: "get-routes"
cols: "sandbox-expressions:13"

DEMO: PREVENTING EXPRESSION LANGUAGE INJECTION EXPLOITS WITH INSTRUMENTATION!

DEMO: PREVENTING EXPRESSION LANGUAGE INJECTION

Runtime Protection!

localhost:8080/ticketbook/el.jsp

HTTP Status 500 – Internal Server Error

Type Exception Report

Message javax.el.ELException: com.contrastsecurity.advice.SensorException: Attempt to escape expression language sandbox prevented by JST rule 'sandbox-expressions'

Description The server encountered an unexpected condition that prevented it from fulfilling the request.

Exception

```
org.apache.jasper.JasperException: javax.el.ELException: com.contrastsecurity.advice.SensorException: Attempt to escape expression language sandbox prevented by JST rule 'sandbox-expressions'
    org.apache.jasper.servlet.JspServletWrapper.handleJspException(JspServletWrapper.java:164)
    org.apache.jasper.servlet.JspServletWrapper.service(JspServletWrapper.java:174)
    org.apache.jasper.servlet.JspServlet.serviceJspFile(JspServlet.java:387)
    org.apache.jasper.servlet.JspServlet.service(JspServlet.java:330)
    javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:741)
    org.apache.tomcat.websocket.server.WsFilter.doFilter(WsFilter.java:52)
```

Root Cause

```
javax.el.ELException: com.contrastsecurity.advice.SensorException: Attempt to escape expression language sandbox prevented by JST rule 'sandbox-expressions'
```


```
20-Apr-2020 12:34:43.750 INFO [localhost-startStop-1] org.apache.tomcat.util.deployDirectory Deploying web application context
20-Apr-2020 12:34:43.762 WARNING [localhost-startStop-1] org.apache.tomcat.util.deployDirectory Config.validateSecurityRoles Security role name 'jst-rule-sandbox-expressions' is not being defined in a <security-role>
20-Apr-2020 12:34:43.767 INFO [localhost-startStop-1] org.apache.tomcat.util.deployDirectory Deployment of web application context for web application context
20-Apr-2020 12:34:43.770 INFO [main] org.apache.coyote.AbstractProtocol.pause Pausing ProtocolHandler ["http-nio-8080"]
20-Apr-2020 12:34:43.780 INFO [main] org.apache.coyote.AbstractProtocol.pause Pausing ProtocolHandler ["ajp-nio-8009"]
20-Apr-2020 12:34:43.782 INFO [main] org.apache.coyote.AbstractProtocol.pause Pausing ProtocolHandler ["ajp-nio-8009"]
20-Apr-2020 15:01:24.893 INFO [Thread-5] org.apache.coyote.AbstractProtocol.pause Pausing ProtocolHandler ["http-nio-8080"]
20-Apr-2020 15:01:24.893 INFO [Thread-5] org.apache.coyote.AbstractProtocol.pause Pausing ProtocolHandler ["ajp-nio-8009"]
```

Executing: /usr/bin/open -a Calculator

WARNING: Access to java.lang.ProcessBuilder.start() scope prevented by security sandbox.


IAST

Interactive Application Security Testing
detects vulnerabilities in both custom
code and libraries during normal use




RASP


Runtime Application Self-Protection
detects attacks and prevents exploits in
both custom code and libraries



SECURITY WORKS BETTER FROM INSIDE-OUT



Yesterday: Scanning and firewalling
at network layer



Today: Security Instrumentation means
accuracy, speed, scalability

SECURITY INSTRUMENTATION STANDARDS



NIST 800-53


- **SA-11(9) | [INTERACTIVE APPLICATION SECURITY TESTING](#)**
Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to employ **interactive application security testing (IAST)** tools to identify flaws and document the results.
- **SI-7(17) | [RUNTIME APPLICATION SELF-PROTECTION](#)**
Implement [*Assignment: organization-defined controls*] for application **self-protection at runtime (RASP)**.



SOFTWARE
SECURITY
STANDARD



- **SSS 9.1 | [RUNTIME APPLICATION SELF-PROTECTION](#)**
The software detects and alerts upon detection of anomalous behavior, such as changes in postdeployment configurations or obvious **attack behavior**.
- **SSS 10.2 | [INTERACTIVE APPLICATION SECURITY TESTING](#)**
Vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components are tested for and fixed prior to release using ... [techniques including]... **interactive application security testing (IAST)**

TURNING SECURITY INTO CODE



...ACTUALLY, THE REAL VULNERABILITIES ARE IN THE PIPELINE ITSELF

APPSEC'S ABILITY TO DELIVER VALUE TO CUSTOMERS, FASTER



Development

Harmony

Security



A totally free and full-strength application security platform

CREATE FREE ACCOUNT

<https://www.contrastsecurity.com/ce>

AVAILABLE NOW

COMING SOON




Source IP	Application	Server	Rule	Start	End	Events
141.82.30.311	WebGoat	production server	General Injection Cross-Site Scripting Path Traversal SQL Injection	4 minutes ago		18
71.220.120.192	WebGoat	production server	General Injection Cross-Site Scripting Path Traversal SQL Injection	6 minutes ago		9
193.137.56.157	WebGoat	production server	General Injection Cross-Site Scripting Path Traversal SQL Injection	12 minutes ago		22
248.60.34.29	WebGoat	production server	General Injection Cross-Site Scripting Path Traversal SQL Injection	12 minutes ago		11
145.78.206.55	WebGoat	production server	General Injection Cross-Site Scripting Path Traversal SQL Injection	12 minutes ago		13
185.140.203.30	WebGoat	production server	General Injection Cross-Site Scripting Path Traversal SQL Injection	12 minutes ago		12

Protect against attacks with RASP

Vulnerability	Severity	Application	Last Detected	Status
Pages Without Anti-Clickjacking Controls on 50 pages	Critical	Petclinic	3 minutes ago	Reported
Hibernate Injection from "lastName" Parameter on "owners" page	Critical	Petclinic	2 minutes ago	Reported
Parameter Pollution on 1 page	Critical	Petclinic	5 minutes ago	Reported
Form Without Autocomplete Prevention on 24 pages	High	Petclinic	5 minutes ago	Reported
Anti-Caching Controls Missing on 41 pages	High	Petclinic	5 minutes ago	Reported
Session-Resteering Allowed in Application or Server Configuration	Critical	Petclinic	11 minutes ago	Reported
Hardcoded Password in Servlet/Servlet/JSP or Servlet/JSP/Servlet/JSP	Critical	Petclinic	17 minutes ago	Reported

Find vulnerabilities with IAST



Secure open-source with SCA

ASK ME ANYTHING

Jeff Williams, Cofounder and CTO
@planetlevel

