



Smart Contract Security
Assessing Solidity smart contracts



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The Open Web Application Security Project



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Positive
com



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- Blockchain Basics
- Front Running
- Reentrancy
- External Calls
- Integer Overflow
- tx.origin
- Gas limit



Ethereum Gas


- Introduced to reduce abuse
- transaction cost (EVM operation)
- gas price (in eth)

Miner receives estimated gas spent* gas price

Remainder of gas cost is returned to the sender



Blockchain Transactions



Frontrunning



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- aka Timing attacks
- Affecting: First In First Out Contracts
- Miner frontrunning
- User frontrunning



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- Examples: DEX, Bancor, random ICOs


```
1  function freeEth(){
2      msg.sender.transfer(1000 ether);
3  }
```

Frontrunning



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- Set upper gas limit
- Set a fixed gas limit
- tx.gasprice
- gasleft()

```
1  function () payable {
2      require(tx.gasprice <= max_gas_price);
3      require(gasleft() <= max_gas_limit);
4      //...
5  }
```



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Commit/Reveal approach

1. Commit



Wait for all votes to be committed....

2. Reveal



Count votes and declare winner!





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Payable functions

```
1 function deposit() payable {
2     balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
3 }
4
5 function () payable {
6     balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
7 }
```

Reentrancy



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150\$ mil stolen

DAO & numerous other contracts

Reentrancy - Vulnerable Contract



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```
1  function deposit() public payable {
2      balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
3  }
4
5  ▼ function withdraw(uint256 _withdraw) public {
6      require(balances[msg.sender] >= withdraw);
7      require(msg.sender.call.value(_withdraw)());
8      balances[msg.sender] -= _withdraw;
9  }
```

Reentrancy - Attack Contract



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```
1 function deposit() payable {
2     balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
3 }
4
5 function withdraw(uint256 _withdraw) public {
6     require(balances[msg.sender] >= _withdraw);
7     require(msg.sender.call.value(_withdraw)());
8     balances[msg.sender] -= _withdraw;
9 }
```

```
1 function attack(address target) payable {
2     c = VictimContract(target);
3     c.deposit.value(0.1 ether)();
4     c.withdraw(0.1 ether);
5 }
6
7 function() payable {
8     c.withdraw(0.1 ether);
9 }
```



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- Always use `transfer()`
- Use sensitive operations before calls to other contracts
- ReentrancyGuard by OpenZeppelin

Reference: <https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-solidity/blob/master/contracts/ReentrancyGuard.sol>



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- Reentrancy is not really obsolete
- “A bridge to connect all bridges”
- Connects ERC20 tokens



Not reentrancy per se

```
1 ▼ function gift(ERC20 _token, uint256 _amount, address _receiver){
2     require(_token.transfer(_receiver, _amount);
3     nativetoken.mint(msg.sender, reward);
4 }
```

```
1 function transfer(address _adress, uint _amount) {
2     vuln_contract.gift(_attack_contract, _amount, _attack_contract);
3 }
```

More like call to the unknown



- Trust that called function will succeed
- Trust that you know what the called function do

```
1  function destroy(){
2      require(!destroyed);
3      msg.sender.send(1000 ether);
4      destroyed = true;
5  }
6
```



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- Ensure external contract returns expected value
- Perform sensitive operations before calling external contract
- Never assume external contract functionality

Integer Overflow



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- Proof of Weak Hands Coin - 866 Eth
- BatchOverflow

Age	From		To	Value	Token
2 hrs 8 mins ago	0x3f2dd0cb25bbf89...	OUT	0x521c526d5b50de...	57,896,044,618,658,100,000,000,000...	Erc20
2 hrs 8 mins ago	0x3f2dd0cb25bbf89...	OUT	0x4473c6396eba3d...	57,896,044,618,658,100,000,000,000...	Erc20
2 hrs 54 mins ago	0x3f2dd0cb25bbf89...	OUT	0x66f471fd1c471bb...	57,896,044,618,658,100,000,000,000...	Erc20
2 hrs 54 mins ago	0x3f2dd0cb25bbf89...	OUT	0x4473c6396eba3d...	57,896,044,618,658,100,000,000,000...	Erc20

Reference: <https://medium.com/@peckshield/alert-new-batchoverflow-bug-in-multiple-erc20-smart-contracts-cve-2018-10299-511067db6536>

Integer Overflow



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- Integer only
- Conversions (Unsigned -> Signed)

```
1  function transfer(int _amount) {  
2      require(_amount >= 0);  
3      balances[msg.sender] -= _amount;  
4      msg.sender.transfer(balances[msg.sender]);  
5  }
```

More overflow cases:

<https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/issues/796#issuecomment-253578925>



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- Perform operations within boundaries
- SafeMath library

```
51     function add(uint256 _a, uint256 _b) internal pure returns (uint256) {  
52         uint256 c = _a + _b;  
53         require(c >= _a);  
54  
55         return c;  
56     }
```

Reference: <https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-solidity/blob/master/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol>

tx.origin



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- Blockchain CSRF?
- tx.origin vs msg.sender

```
1 ▼ function withdraw(uint _amount) {  
2     require(tx.origin == owner);  
3     msg.sender.transfer(1000 ether);  
4 }
```


tx.origin



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call()	For Vulnerable Contract
tx.origin	User
msg.sender	User




tx.origin



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call()	For Malicious Contract	For Vulnerable Contract
tx.origin	User	User
msg.sender	User	Malicious Contract





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- call vs delegatecall
- Caution when using tx.origin



- Looping over unknown arrays
- Leads to denial of service

```
1  function distribute() public {
2      for(uint i = 0; i < investors.length; i++) {
3          // Important administrative tasks
4          // ...
5      }
6  }
```



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- Avoid looping over arrays of unknown length
- Set an upper limit for the array length
- Control the loop by checking `gasleft()`

```
1 function distribute() public {
2     while(i < investors.length && gasleft() > 20000) {
3         // Important administrative tasks
4         // ...
5     }
6 }
```

Things we didn't cover



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- Randomness (is hard)
- Visibility (Function, secret)
- Unexpected ether (contract-suicide)
- Delegatecall (3rd party libraries)
- Storage



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Questions?