

Ivan Ivanov



Introduction

A .NET dev who builds secure systems by day and breaks them (responsibly) by... afternoon

- Senior Principal Software Engineer "Reporting, Documents & Tools" @Progress
- Security Champion



- How to fail with .NET reflection?
- Write your own custom (de)serialization!

. . .





Common Myths

"Easy, don't use .NET"


Reflection







It can't be that bad...









CVSS Base Score: 8.8

Impact Subscore: 5.9

Exploitability Subscore: 2.8

CVSS Temporal Score: NA

CVSS Environmental Score: NA


Modified Impact Subscore: NA

Overall CVSS Score: 8.8

Show Equations


CVSS v3.1 Vector

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H



"But I should be fine, I guess..."

- "I read that MSDN article: <u>Deserialization Risks...</u>, and I use none of these"
- We have custom implementation
- "SAST tool is green"
- We have a block list for all the "bad" types that we know



Marked Safe From

Deserialization attacks
Today



"I can cast it and be safe"


```
var suspectObject = myBinaryFormatter.Deserialize(untrustedData);

//Check below is too late! Execution may have already occurred.
if (suspectObject is SomeDangerousObjectType)
{
    //generate warnings and dispose of suspectObject
}
```

*Unsafe deserialization is the second most evil thing after screenshots of code




"...I can cast it and be safe"






"My AppDomain is my castle"






"I will write my own assembly verification"



"I read the invoked code. Trust me, bro!"





Placeholder, one of the demo cases should be revamped as it was too specific to reporting context



OK, Now Mat?

Allowlist vs Denylist

Allowlists:

- Align with "Secure by default" principle
- Require less maintenance
- Are more beginner friendly to new developers on the team



Rule Enforcement

- Code Analysis and Roslyn Analyzers
 - Write your own
 - Use a 3rd party one





Demo

Q8A