### **OWASP AppSec**Toronto, ON – 2013-07-10



### The OWASP Foundation

http://www.owasp.org

# OWASP – Beyond the Top 10

### André Rochefort

TELUS Security Assessment Services Sr. Consultant

andre.rochefort@telus.com

"All programmers are playwrights and all computers are lousy actors." (unknown)



### What is this about?

### **OWASP Present & Future Solutions:**

- Flagship Projects
- Labs Projects
- Incubator Projects



### Communities

### A Vision for OWASP

Outreach


**Projects** 

StakeHolders

Focus

Support

Platform





# Target Audiences

- 1) Students\* and AppSec neophytes
  - The ones eager to learn
- 2) Developers and IT Security Administrators
  - The ones anxious to defend
- 3) AppSec Professionals & Community
  - The ones making all the noise



# Why?

- Raise awareness
- Call to Arms / Engage
- Sharpen those soft skills

"No man is exempt from saying silly things; the mischief is to say them deliberately." - Michel de Montaigne

### WebAppSec Resources vs. Backlog



Assumptions	Number
Number of websites on the public Internet	672,985,183
Number of hours a webappsec pen-tester takes to assess the average website	16
Number of work hours in the average year	2,000
Number of people working as webappsec pen-testers today	300,000
Number of scans required per year	4
Results	
Number of web application testers needed to test the entire Internet manually:	21,535,526
Number we will have to hire to get full global coverage:	21,235,526
Number of sites that won't get assessed by hand due to shortage:	663,610,183
Percent of all Sites Covered by Manual Assessments:	1.4%



# The Top 10 (and other news)



### Recent OWASP News

- The 2013 WebAppSec Top 10 Launched
  - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\_Top
     Ten\_Project
- Source Code Analyzer Coverity joins OWASP
  - http://www.coverity.com/company/pressreleases/read/coverity-joins-open-web-applicationsecurity-project-owasp
- State of the Community

# OWASP Top 10 2013

OWASP Top 10 – 2010 (Previous)	OWASP Top 10 – 2013 (New)
A1 – Injection	A1 – Injection
A3 – Broken Authentication and Session Management	A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management
A2 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References	A4 – Insecure Direct Object References
A6 – Security Misconfiguration	A5 – Security Misconfiguration
A7 – Insecure Cryptographic Storage – Merged with A9 –>	A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure
A8 – Failure to Restrict URL Access – Broadened into ->	A7 – Missing Function Level Access Control
A5 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
<buried a6:="" in="" misconfiguration="" security=""></buried>	A9 – Using Known Vulnerable Components
A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards	A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
A9 – Insufficient Transport Layer Protection	Merged with 2010-A7 into new 2013-A6



## **OWASP Top 10 2013**

### Additional Risks to Consider

The Top 10 cover a lot of ground, but there are many other risks you should consider and evaluate in your organization. Some of these have appeared in previous versions of the Top 10, and others have not, including new attack techniques that are being identified all the time. Other important application security risks (in alphabetical order) that you should also consider include:

- Clickjacking
- Concurrency Flaws
- Denial of Service (Was 2004 Top 10 Enter
- Expression Language Injection (CWE-917)
- Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling (Was part of 2007 Top 10 Entry 2007-A6)
- Insufficient Anti-automation (CWE-799)
- Insufficient Logging and Accountability (Related to 2007 Top 10 Entry 2007-A6)
- Lack of Intrusion Detection and Response
- Malicious File Execution (Was 2007 Top 10 Entry 2007-A3)
- Mass Assignment (CWE-915)
- User Privacy

e.g. PRISM

e.g. WS Amplification
e.g. Facebook

(Was part of 2007 Top 10 - Entry 2007-A6)

Shadow

Profiles



### Other Top 10s

OWASP Mobile Top 10 Risks


- Top 10 Mobile Risks (refresh: 2013)
- Top 10 Mobile Security Controls
- Top 10 Source Code Flaws (2010)
  - Top 10 Defenses
  - Top 10 Cloud Risks

### Also:

 Alternative classification schemes, e.g. The Seven Pernicious Kingdoms



# Gartner Magic Quadrant





### State of the Community


- Mark Curphey on OWASP; Seconauts, and Security Tools for Developers
- OWASP Top 10 9 Too Many?
- Dini Cruz and OWASP in 2014
  - http://blog.diniscruz.com/2012/11/i-wish-that-owasp-in-2014.html
- Pushing for more activity in T.O.



# Top 5 Developer Fears

### (from: Itworld/StackOverflow)

- 1. Screwing up\*
- 2. Losing their jobs
- 3. No longer liking the job
- 4. Learning new technologies
- 5. Incompetent
  Management/Coworkers





# Beyond the Top 10



## The Inventory\*

- Resources for WebAppSec Training
- Secure Coding Materials, APIs, SCAs
- Tools for Vulnerability Mitigation, Discovery
- Miscellany in between



# The Learning Curve

### **OWASP Tools for WAS Education:**

- Tutorials / Exercised-based Training
- Vulnerable Web Applications
- Books!

Download the PDFs free or buy hardcopies and support OWASP



### OWASP WebGoat



Introduction
General
Access Control Flaws
AJAX Security
Authentication Flaws
Buffer Overflows
Code Quality
Concurrency
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

### Phishing with XSS

### LAB: Cross Site Scripting

Stage 1: Stored XSS

Stage 2: Block Stored XSS using Input Validation

Stage 3: Stored XSS Revisited

Stage 4: Block Stored XSS using Output Encoding

Stage 5: Reflected XSS

Stage 6: Block Reflected XSS

Stored XSS Attacks

Reflected XSS Attacks

Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

CSRF Prompt By-Pass

CSRF Token By-Pass

Solution Videos

Restart this Lesson

### Stage 4

Stage 4: Block Stored XSS using Output Encoding.

### THIS LESSON ONLY WORKS WITH THE DEVELOPER VERSION OF WEBGOAT

Implement a fix to block XSS after it is read from the database. Repeat stage 3. Verify that 'David' is not affected by Bruce's profile attack.






### OWASP WebGoat

- Platform variants: Java, .NET and Rails (coming), Desktop(+Top 5?)
- Mobile variants: iGoat/GoatDroid
- Content-rich; Roll-Your-Own Lessons
- Video tutorials online & downloadable
- Report Cards, Challenge Mode

### OWASP Mutillidae 2





### OWASP Mutillidae 2

- Includes HTML5-oriented lessons
- Plenty of content (lessons, tutorials)
- Video guides available (YouTube)
- Gamified! Keeps track of your score
- PHP, requires (L|W|M)AMP stack



### **OWASP Bricks**









### File Upload pages

Each file upload page has its own security mechanisms. Some pages break them, upload shell scripts, execute them and gain access.


### Welcome to Bricks!

Bricks is a web application security learning platform built on PHP and MySQL. The project focuses on variations of commonly application security issues. Each 'Brick' has some sort of security issue which can be leveraged manually or using automated s The mission is to 'Break the Bricks' and thus learn the various aspects of web application security.

Bricks is a completely free and open source project brought to you by OWASP. The complete documentation and instruction v be accessed or downloaded for free. Bricks are classified into three different sections: login pages, file upload pages and contractions.

**OWASP Bricks** 






**Upload #1**Simple file upload.



# OWASP Security Shepherd



### Admin Next Challenge

Insecure Direct Object References

### What are Insecure Direct Object References?

Imagine a web page that allows you to view your personal information. The web page that shows the user their information is generated based on a user ID. If this page was vulnerable to insecure Direct Object References an attack would be able to modify the user identifier to reference any user object in the system. Insecure Direct Object References occur when an application references an object by it's actual ID or name. This object that is referenced directly is used to generate a web page. If the application does not verify that the user is allowed to reference this object, then the object is insecurely referenced.

Attackers can use insecure object references to compromise any information that can be referenced by the parameter in question. In the above example, the attacker can access any users personal information.

The severity of insecure direct object references varies depending on the data that is been compromised. If the



### Guided Lessons

e-Learning Project (CBT)



(live version: <a href="http://hackademic1.teilar.gr/">http://hackademic1.teilar.gr/</a>)

http://vicnum.ciphertechs.com/ (Games!)

http://google-gruyere.appspot.com/

http://www.hackertest.net/

Advanced: <a href="https://www.hacking-lab.com/about/">https://www.hacking-lab.com/about/</a> (english language issues)



### \*Vulnerable Web Apps

(\*intentionally!)

- OWASP Broken Web Apps (VM)
- Damn Vulnerable Web Application
- KILL ALL THE VENDOR'S SITES! (live)
- OWASP SiteGenerator (RIP)
- Build your own, then break it!





### More from OWASP

- Book: WebGoat and WebScarab
- The AppSec Tutorial Series (Videos):
  - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\_Appse
     c\_Tutorial\_Series
- Cheat Sheets
- Book: Securing WebGoat with ModSecurity



### Tangent: Visualization

- Tilt (DEMO!)
- Logstalgia (DEMO!)
- glTail (video!)
- Kinectaploit (video!)
- http://secviz.org/



psDoom





### Defending the Code

- Guides, Guides and More Guides
- Enterprise Security API
- AntiSAMY
- Source Code Analyzers
- Java Dependency Checker



# Guides! (ick, PDFs)

- Web Application Secure Development Guide
- Code Review Guide (2.0 underway)
- Testing Guide
- Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)
- Periodic Table of Vulnerabilities
- Application Security Verification Standard



# Security Requirements

YES NO

YES NO

Network security includes the system of computers, routers, cables, switches and wireless access points. It is the entire system of transport and storage technologies.

- Are networks segregated physically and/or logically to separate systems containing personal information from public networks such as the Internet?
- Where a local area network containing personal information is connected to a public network, does the organization use perimeter defence safeguards (e.g. firewalls, routers, intrusion detection or prevention systems, anti-virus/anti-spyware software, etc.) to mediate all traffic and to protect systems that are accessible from the Internet?

7.3	Are systems t	Policy Source	Security Category	Policy Statement
	"hardened" (e			
	applications a	DEP 390	Password	Strong passwords will be use
7.4	Are ports clos services are n		Control	shall have these minimum characteristics:
7.5	Are these safe			Have a length of 7 or more alphanumeric characters for Windows based systems, 8 c more for Unix based system
				Contain both upper and low characters (e.g. a-z, A-Z)
				Have digits and punctuation characters as well as letters ( 9,!@#\$%^&*(){}[]:";'<>?,./)

Password

Control

**DEP 390** 

### V2 - Authentication Verification Requirements

The Authentication Verification Requirements define a set of requirements for generating and handling account credentials safely. The table below defines the corresponding verification requirements that apply for each of the four verification levels.

Table 2 - OWASP ASVS Authentication Requirements (V2)

zation use perimeter									
sion detection or ftware, etc.) to are accessible from		Verification Requirement		Level 1A	Level 1B	Level 2A	Level 2B	Level 3	Level 4
Policy Statement \	V2.1	Verify that all pages and resources require authentication except those specifically intended to be public.	<b>~</b>	1	<b>*</b>	~	~	✓	
Strong passwords will be use shall have these minimum characteristics:	V2.2	Verify that all password fields do not echo the user's password when it is entered, and that password fields (or the forms that contain them) have autocomplete disabled.		<b>✓</b>	<b>~</b>	<b>✓</b>	<b>~</b>	<b>~</b>	<b>~</b>
Have a length of 7 or more alphanumeric characters for Windows based systems, 8 c more for Unix based system	V2.3	Verify that if a maximum number of authentication attempts is exceeded, the account is locked for a period of time long enough to deter brute force attacks.		<b>✓</b>	١	<b>~</b>	<b>~</b>	~	<b>~</b>
Contain both upper and low characters (e.g. a-z, A-Z)	V2.4	Verify that all authentication controls are enforced on the server side.				<b>~</b>	✓	<b>✓</b>	<b>~</b>
Have digits and punctuation characters as well as letters (e.g. 0-9,!@#\$%^&*(){}[]:";'<>?,./)									
Are not words in any language, slang, dialect, or jargon									
All user-level passwords (e.g.,		*may only apply at user level,	Does the application expire						
email, desktop computer, etc.)		not application level.							
must be changed at least every 90		uses a system whereby users							



### **OWASP ASVS**

### Flagship Project

At higher levels in ASVS, the use of tools is encouraged. But to be effective, the tools must be heavily tailored and configured to the application and framework in use

A standard to verify a

web app's security

Application- and lifecycle- independent

8

Manual
Design and
Code Review

Manual Design Review

Manual Test and Review



**Tools** 

OWASP ASVS Levels 2 — 3 — 4




# OWASP Cornucopia







### elevation of privilege

Microsoft.com/security/sdl/eop











### ab0ut

[d0x3d!] is a board game designed to introduce a diverse body of students to network security terminology, attack & defend mechanics, and basic computer [n3ws]

Check out our article with Control-Alt-Hack's Tamara Denning on tabletop-gaming in security, appearing in the May-June issue of IEEE Security & Privacy.



#### **Game includes:**

- 1 rulebook
- 3 dice
- 156 game cards
  - 16 Hacker cards
  - 56 Mission cards
  - 72 Entropy cards
  - 12 Attendance cards
- 58 Hacker Cred tokens
- 42 Money tokens






Daily Crossword
Web Application Security

OWASP Via MyApps Via Curity Ά S R W O S Ν G S S K Ν Ε N C O D Н S Р Α Ε C G O D 0 G S

Not hard enough?



RegEx Crossword FTOMGWTF



### OWASP ESAPI

- FREE Security Control Library
- Reference implementations included
- Extensible, customizable, mature\*
- Support includes Java, .NET, PHP, ...
- AppSensor integration
  - "Good artists copy; great artists steal"




## OWASP AntiSAMY

- Policy-based HTML/CSS input validator
- Support includes Java and .NET
- Sample policies available
- PHP: use HTMLPurifier instead
- Sadly, dormant.



## OWASP YASCA





### OWASP YASCA

- Yet Another Source/Static Code Analyzer
- Frontend to Lint, FindBugs, ClamAV,...
- Pattern-matching engine
- Still in active development

## OWASP Code Crawler

```
OWASP Code Crawler 2.7
              Windows Tools
                            External Links ?
File
        View
              Actions 🔻 🙆 Utilities Notepad Calculator Links Google MSDN T 29 ToLoC 9/100 T% 📑
 Options 🚙
           private String computeHash( String password,
              ·····String passwordSalt )
   216
          ····throws Exception {
   217
              byte[] buffer = null;
          byte[] key = null;
   219
         ·····byte[]-hash-=-null;
   220
          .....MessageDigest md5 = null;
         String hashEncoded = null;
   222
   223
         String salt = ( passwordSalt.split( "\\$" ) ) [0];
   224
             -try {
   225
               buffer = URLDecoder.decode( password,
                "ISO-8859-1"·).getBytes( "ISO-8859-1"·);
   226
                 key = URLDecoder.decode( salt,
   227
              "ISO-8859-1"·).getBytes(·"ISO-8859-1"·);
   228
   229
               ...md5 = MessageDigest.getInstance( "MD5" );
                --md5.update( buffer );
   230
          · · · · · · · hash = ·md5.digest( ·key ·);
   231
                 hashEncoded = URLEncoder.encode( new String( hash,
         "ISO-8859-1".).
   235
         ·····catch ( UnsupportedEncodingException uee ) {
         throw new Exception( "Error computing hash.");
   238
   239
 Threat Analysis
                                          Keyword MD5
 STRIDE Category
              Repudiation
 STRIDE Control
              Non-Repudiation
 Threat Description If cryptography is used then is a strong enough cipher used i.e. AES or 3DES. What size key is used, the larger the better. Where is hashing
               performed. Are password that are being persisted hashed, they should be. How are random numbers generated? is the PRNG "random"
OWASP Code Crawler 2.7
```



## OWASP CodeCrawler

- Static SCA supporting Java and .NET
- Last Update: April 2010 (3-person team)
- RegEx filtering; basic, configurable pattern matching
- No Data Flow validation; Windows Only
- High False Positive/False Negative potential



# Defending the Web App

ModSecurity Core Rule Set (new release July 2)

AppSensor (App-based IDS)

More WAF projects on the horizon




# Hunting for Vulnerability

- WebScarab
- Zed Attack Proxy
- JoomScan and CMS Scan
- O2 platform






## OWASP WebScarab



# OWASP Zed Attack Proxy







Tools Bookmarks 🕶

Download ▼

Support ▼

#### Tools

#### Information Gathering

Flagfox Displays a flag icon indicating the current webserver's physical location with many additional features.

JSView Get straight access to scripts and stylesheets included in the current web page.

PassiveRecon Perform passive discovery of target resources utilizing publicly available information.

**Wappalyzer** Uncovers underlying technologies used on websites like CMS, e-commerce systems, JavaScript frameworks, analytics tools etc..

View Dependencies Shows you all the files which were loaded to show the current page.

Link Sidebar View, search and test hyperlinks in a web page.

#### **Application Auditing**

Hackbar Simple security audit / Penetration test tool.

#### Editors

JSView Get straight access to scripts and stylesheets included in the current web page. View the source code external stylesheets and javascripts.

**Firebug** Edit, debug, and monitor CSS, HTML, and JavaScript live in any web page.

#### Proxy

HTTP Fox A built in local proxy for analyzing traffic.


FoxyProxy A proxy management tool with ability to switch between multiple proxies with few clicks.

**Proxy Tool** A proxy management tool with lots of additional features to enable the privacy.


#### **Network Utilities**

FireFTP FTP/SFTP Client which provides intuitive access to


# Includes Fire Constraint Marin Domain Finder













## OWASP OWTF

Offensive Web Testing Framework GASP! VIDEO BREAK!


https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\_OWTF



#### Pantera Web Assessment Studio (WAS) Project: OWASP ASSESSMENT

File Tools Modules Help





>> GET http://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Common.css&action=raw&ctype=te...

<< HTTP/1.1 200 OK

[2006-08-18 | 17:46:07] 🗐 ? 🍥

>> GET http://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=MediaWiki:Monobook.css&action=raw&ctype=...

<< HTTP/1.1 200 OK

[2006-08-18 | 17:46:07] 🗐 ? 🔘


>> GET http://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=-&action=raw&gen=css&maxage=18000

<< HTTP/1.1 200 OK

[2006-08-18 | 17:46:07] 🗒 ? 🎯

>> GET http://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=-&action=raw&gen=js

## O2 Platform





## O2 Platform

NO MORE





**PLATFORM** 



WITH SECURITY FINDINGS

#### **PROBLEM:**

BlackBox: Easily create XSS PoCs that are specific to the application and are much more than the ALERT pop-up box that nobody outside the WebAppSecurity space understand's it implication

#### **SOLUTION:**

O2:)





# WARNING: TANGENT

- Jon McCoy @ SecTor 2012
- <video excerpt>



# Swiss Army Knives

- OWASP Mantra OS (Mobile: MobiSec)
- Samurai Web Testing Framework

#### Alternatives:

- Kali (aka BackTrack)
- Fedora Security Spin



## Incubators and More

- iSABEL Proxy Server, NAXSI, WAF Project
- Xenotix XSS Framework vs. XSSer, X5s
- Security Tools for Developers
- Java HTML Sanitizer (released)
- S.T.I.N.G. For Security Requirements?
- VaultDB vs Scytale (DBMS crypto-proxies)



# Project Gaps?

- Lots of duplication; re-inventing the wheel
- Inconsistent Quality, no unity in delivery
- No visualization projects; forensics a stub
- Fragmentation; resources spread thin
- Over-promising; under-delivering
- Solutions?

### **Google Summer of Code 2013**

Select program:


GSoC 2013 (... 🔻



#### **ACCEPTED PROJECTS**

List of projects accepted into Google Summer of Code 2013

		RegExp Search CSV Export
Student 🗢	Title	Organization
		owasp
Abdelhadi	ZAP Proxy: CMS Scanner	OWASP
Alessandro Fanio González	OWASP OWTF - Unit Test Framework	OWASP
Ankush Jindal	OWASP OWTF - Multiprocessing	OWASP
Assem Chelli	OWASP OWTF - Reporting	OWASP
Bharadwaj Machiraju	OWASP OWTF - INBOUND PROXY WITH M	NIT OWASP
Cosmin Stefan	Enhanced HTTP Session Handling and use	ers OWASP
Daniel Kvist	Plugin api and plugin actions interface in	1 COWASP
Mihai Pitu	OWASP ModSecurity CRS - Port to Java	OWASP
Pulasthi Mahawithana	OWASP ZAP - SAML 2.0 Support	OWASP
Rahul Chaudhary	OWASP PHP Security Project	OWASP
Rauf Butt	ZAP - Exploring Advanced reporting using	g OWASP
🔑 Filter 🤄 Refresh 🎟 Columns	Page 1 of 1 ▶> ▶□	View 1 - 11 of 1



# Go, \$20 oronto, Go!

- Chapter participation appears to be on the rise
- Tremendous amount of infosec talent in the GTA and surrounding areas
- IRC? Reddit? Hackernews?
- Anyone need an opening act next time?



??? Q & A

Bookmark: <a href="http://owasp.blogspot.ca/">http://owasp.blogspot.ca/</a>



# Thank you

### THE PERFECT MARTINI

- 1. Pour gin, vermouth, and olives into the trash where they belong.
- 2. Drink whiskey

I always keep a supply of stimulant handy in case I see a snake--which I also keep handy.

W. C. Fields (1880 - 1946)

Toothpaste For Dinner.com

