How CSP Will (maybe) Solve the XSS Problem

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XSS is so 1998
So is XSS prevention
What is XSS

<input name="id" value="${id}"/>
What is XSS

"&lt;script&gt;badStuff()&lt;/script&gt;
What is XSS

```html
<input name="id" value="">
<script>badStuff()</script>
```
What is XSS

<script>
    var id=${id};
</script>
What is XSS

0;badStuff();
What is XSS

```html
<script>
    var id=0; badStuff();
</script>
```
What is XSS

```html
<script>
    setInterval(1000, '${todo}')
</script>
```
What is XSS

badStuff();
What is XSS

```html
<script>
setInterval(1000, 'badStuff()')
</script>
```
What is XSS

<input name="id"
onBlur="doStuff(${id})"/>
What is XSS

); badStuff(
What is XSS

<input name="id"

onBlur="doStuff(); badStuff()"/>
What is XSS

<a href="${link}">Hi Mom!</a>
What is XSS

javascript:badThings()
What is XSS

<a href="javascript:badThings()">Hi Mom!</a>

Hi Mom!</a>
What is XSS

```html
<a href="#" onClick="doThing('${link}')">
  Hi Mom!
</a>
```
What is XSS

'');badStuff('}
What is XSS

<a href="#" onClick="doThing(‘\x27\x39;\x27);badStuff(\x27\x39;\x27)">Hi Mom!</a>
What is XSS

<a href="#" onclick="doThing("");badStuff("")">
  Hi Mom!
</a>
What is DOM XSS

```html
<script>
  document.body.innerHTML =
    document.getElementById('name').value;
</script>
```
What is DOM XSS

```html
<img src=x onError=badThings()>|
```
What is DOM XSS

<body>
<img src=x onError=badThings()>
</body>
What is DOM XSS

```html
<script>
  var name = $('#name').val
  $('body').html(name)
</script>
```
What is DOM XSS

```
Name

<img src=x onError=badThings()>|
```
What is DOM XSS

```html
<body>
<img src=x onError=badThings()>
</body>
```
jQuery is XSS

$(data)
What is XSS

```html
<style>
a {
    color: ${usersFavoriteColor};
}
</style>
```
What is XSS

I dunno, something with SVG, CSS Expressions, etc. The list grows.
Because Dr. Mario

Scriptless Attacks –
Stealing the Pie Without Touching the Sill

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ABSTRACT
Due to their high practical impact, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks have attracted a lot of attention from the security community members. In the same way, a plethora of more or less effective defense techniques have been proposed, addressing the causes and effects of XSS vulnerabilities.

As a result, an adversary often can no longer inject or even execute arbitrary scripting code in several real-life scenarios.

In this paper, we examine the attack surface that remains after XSS and similar scripting attacks are supposedly mitigated by preventing an attacker from executing JavaScript code. We address the question of whether an attacker really needs JavaScript or similar functionality to perform attacks aiming for information theft. The surprising result is that an attacker can also abuse Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) in combination with other Web techniques like plain HTML, inactive SVG images or font files. Through several case

Keywords
Scriptless Attacks, XSS, CSS, SVG, HTML5, Attack Fonts

1. INTRODUCTION
In the era of Web 2.0 technologies and cloud computing, a rich set of powerful online applications is available at our disposal. These Web applications allow activities such as online banking, initiating commercial transactions at the online stores, composing e-mails which may contain sensitive information, or even managing personal medical records online. It is therefore only natural to wonder what kind of measures are necessary to protect such data, especially in connection with security and privacy concerns.

A prominent real-life attack vector is Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), a type of injection attack in which an adversary injects malicious scripts into an otherwise benign (and trusted)
Why do those crazy things?
CODE != DATA

“<a href=" + link + ">text</a>”

“select * from table where id = “ + id
But we don’t do stupid things
I will religiously escape content
I will religiously escape content part 2

XSS Prevention Rules

2.1 RULE #0 - Never Insert Untrusted Data Except in Allowed Locations

2.2 RULE #1 - HTML Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Element Content

2.3 RULE #2 - Attribute Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Common Attributes

2.4 RULE #3 - JavaScript Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into JavaScript Data

   2.4.1 RULE #3.1 - HTML escape JSON values in an HTML context and read the data

      2.4.1.1 JSON entity encoding

      2.4.1.2 HTML entity encoding

2.5 RULE #4 - CSS Escape And Strictly Validate Before Inserting Untrusted Data into CSS

2.6 RULE #5 - URL Escape Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML URL Parameters

2.7 RULE #6 - Sanitize HTML Markup with a Library Designed for the Job

2.8 RULE #7 - Prevent DOM-based XSS

2.9 Bonus Rule #1: Use HTTPOnly cookie flag

2.10 Bonus Rule #2: Implement Content Security Policy
I will religiously escape content part 3

JSFuck – Write any JavaScript with 6 Characters: []()!+
JSFuck is an esoteric and educational programming style based on the atomic parts of JavaScript. It uses only six different characters to write and execute code.

It does not depend on a browser, so you can even run it on Node.js.

Use the form below to convert your own script. Uncheck "eval source" to get back a plain string.

```
alert(1)
```

The page at www.jsfuck.com says:

```
1
```

1227 chars
I’ll sanitize / validate input
I’ll use a scanner

SNEAK ATTACK!
I’ll perform periodic assessments
Security is about layers
Everyone knows that insulating products, like "thermoses" and koozies help keep hot things hot and cold things cold, but the burning question: How do they know?
Thermos? Koozie?
How does the browser know?

```html
<script>goodStuff()</script>
<script>badStuff()</script>
```
CSP To The Rescue
CSP?
Why CSP?
What is dangerous?

- inline javascript
- `<script>...</script>`
- `<input onBlur="...">
- `<a href="javascript:...">
- on-the-fly code generation
- `setTimeout, eval, new Function("...")`
“Doctor, it hurts when I do this”
“Don’t do that”
CSP is more than XSS protection
Nothing is free
Removing the dangerous stuff
Report–Only mode
Techniques for removing inline javascript
CSP 1.1

- Whitelisting inline `<script>` in a safe way
Inline code

<script>
stuff()
</script>
Nonces

<script nonce="34298734...">
stuff()
</script>
Hashes

<script>
stuff()
</script>
Hashes are more secure than nonces
What you still can’t do

• Inline event handlers
  • `<input onBlur="doGoodThing()">`
  • `<a href="javascript:…">`
• Dynamic javascript
  • `<script> var id=${id} </script>`
  • Hash values won’t match
  • Nonce provides absolutely no security
Automatic CSP Protection
(Silverish bullet)
Whitelisting javascript

- Find all javascript
- Compute all hash values
- Whitelist scripts with corresponding hashes
Assume: Sane web framework

- Do a regular expression search over all templates, capture all inline javascript
- Store a map of the hash(es) in each individual file
- Each time the file is rendered, add the corresponding hashes to the header
Developer productivity

- Serve dynamic hash values in (!production), serve hardcoded hash values in production
guard 'rake', :task => 'secure_headers:generate_hashes', :task_args => ['true'] do
  watch(%r{^app/.*\.html\.(erb|html|mustache)$})
end