



FOX-IT

EXPERTS IN IT SECURITY





Vulnerability Attack Countermeasure
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)



About me

- Niels Teusink
- With Fox-IT since 2005
- IT Security Expert / Penetration Tester
- Personal blog: <http://blog.teusink.net/>



Vulnerability

1. XSS

2. Injection flaws

3. Malicious file execution

4. Insecure direct object reference

5. CSRF

6. Information leakage & error handling

7. Broken authentication & sessions

8. Insecure crypto

9. Insecure communications

10. Failure to restrict URL access

OWASP Top 10 2007



Cross-Site?

Donate

funds to OWASP earmarked for Netherlands.

toolbox

Google Translate

Select Language

[Gadgets powered by Go](#)



OWASP New Zealand Day 2009

dinsdag, 28. juli


16:00 OWASP Cincinnati Julv Meeting

Afspraken worden weergegeven in tijdzone: GMT (geen zomertijd)

[+ Google Agenda](#)



How it works



Attack: A Case Study

December 2008: CSRF in Motorola ADSL2+ Modem



Attack: A Case Study (2)

```
<img src='http://192.168.1.254/  
Forms/remoteRES_1?NSS_RemotePas  
sword=ihackyou&NSS_EnableWANAdm  
inAccessRES=on&timeoutDisable=0  
&Enable=Enable' >
```



Attack: A Case Study (3)

- Now what?
- Steal provider credentials
- Modify DNS settings



Mantis Bug Tracker

```
http://www.example.com/mantis/ma  
nage_user_create.php?username=f  
oo&realname=aa&password=aa&pass  
word_verify=aa&email=foo@attack  
er.com&access_level=90&protecte  
d=0&enabled=1
```



Effect: remote code execution



Felten & Zeller, 28-09-2008

1. Open a new account
2. Transfer money to new account
3. Add attacker as a contact
4. Transfer money to new contact



JSON Hijacking

Gmail, 01-01-2007

```
<script  
  src='http://docs.google.com/data/  
contacts?out=js&show=ALL&psor  
t=Affinity&callback=google&max=  
99999'>
```



Countermeasure(s)

- Referrer checking
- CSRF token
- .NET ViewState
- Require extra information



Refer(r)er checking

- Where did you come from?
- Not a very good measure
 - Not everybody sends referrers
 - They can be spoofed
 - CSRF is not always ‘cross-site’



CSRF Token

- Every request contains a 'secret'
 - Unique per session or request
- Example: OWASP CSRFGuard



CSRF Token

```
<form action='transfer.do' method='POST'>  
Amount: <input name='amount'>  
Account no: <input name='account'>  
<input type='hidden' name='antiCSRF'  
  value='23492408304834209'>  
<input type='submit'>  
</form>
```



.NET ViewState

- Only applicable to ASP.NET
- Using the ViewState to store a user-specific value
 - Don't disable the MAC



Require extra information

- Password when changing password
- Password when changing profile
- CAPTCHA



But...

- Make sure you do not have any XSS vulnerabilities



Questions?



Resources

Interesting cases:

Motorola	http://www.neohaxor.org/2008/12/01/csrf-vulns-on-local-network-devices/
Simple Machines Forum	http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/6993
DDWRT	http://archive.cert.uni-stuttgart.de/bugtraq/2008/12/msg00085.html
Mantis	http://www.ush.it/team/ush/hack-mantis111/adv.txt
ING Direct etc.	http://citp.princeton.edu/csrf/
Digg	http://4diggers.blogspot.com/

CSRF in general:

OWASP	http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery
Wikipedia	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery
Shiflett.org	http://shiflett.org/articles/cross-site-request-forgeries

Books:

The Web Application Hacker's Handbook – David Stuttard, Marcus Pinto



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