Supercharged John the Ripper Techniques

Austin OWASP

Spring, 2011

Rick Redman - KoreLogic

Introduction

Who am I:

Rick Redman – Senior Security Consultant – Penetration Tester

Bio: During my 11 years as a security practitioner, I have delivered numerous application and network penetration tests for a wide range of Fortune 500 and government clients. I serve as KoreLogic's subject matter expert in advanced password cracking systems. I present at a variety of security forums such as ISSA Chapters and AHA (Austin Hackers Anonymous) and provides technical security training on topics such as web application security. I has served as a member of a penetration testing tiger team supporting Sandia National Laboratories. I am a graduate of Purdue University with a degree in Computer Science in the CERIAS/COAST program taught by Gene Spafford.

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Who is KoreLogic

Who is KoreLogic:

- An expert-based information security and IT risk management firm.
- Serve Fortune 500 and Government clients.
- 500+ security engagements delivered.
- Invited speakers: OWASP, Shmoocon, CEIC, SIM, ISSA, DoD, Universities
- Winner: File Carving Challenge, Digital Forensic Research Workshop.
- Creator: "Crack Me If You Can" password cracking contest at DEFCON
- Privately held and founder-operated allow us to practice a quality- and client-first approach.

Today's Focus

Today's goal:

Show default password cracking methods/tools. Pros/Cons of each.

Show patterns used by users in environments that enforce password complexity (patterns observed from over 3.1 million hashes cracked by KoreLogic).

Improve the methods/rules used to crack passwords, in order to crack large amounts of complex passwords.

Give advice on how to *create* complex passwords that aren't based on known patterns.

- **OWASP: Show previous errors done by web application developers that exposed passwords.**

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The Problem...(OS/Network)

10 Users choose bad passwords
20 SysAdmins put in place password complexity rules
30 GOTO 10

Corporate users are becoming more and more aware of the importance of stronger passwords. They are **forced** to follow password requirements.

- Tools used to crack passwords, need to be made more aware of the patterns used by users who are forced into meeting password complexity rules. (Currently, most tools do <u>not</u> do this.   )

- Development of current password cracking tools does not revolve around patterns and wordlists.

Instead seems to be concentrated on more formats, brute forcing, using the "cloud", distributing work, GPU cards, etc

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The Problem...(Web Applications)

10 Users choose bad passwords
20 Web sites on the Internet allow this to occur
30 Web sites get hacked – Users' passwords are cracked
40 Nothing changes – GOTO 10

- Developers are not aware of proper methods of storing password hashes

- The Internet stays "unsafe" and no progress is made in the web application world to educate or **protect** our users.

- Applications continue to allow users to choose crappy passwords.

- Applications continue to not allow security conscious users to protect themselves (See: List of websites that don't allow special characters in their passwords, or limit the length allowed)

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Example Hashes / Hash Types

Type	Hash
Plaintext	badpass
MD2	9C5B091C305744F046E551DB45E7C036
MD4	640061BD33AA12D92FC40EA87EA408DE
MD5	F1BFC72887902986B95F3DFDF1B81A5B
SHA-1	AF73C586F66FDC99ABF1EADB2B71C5E46C80C24A
LM	4CF3B1913C3FF376
NT	986CA892BEAB33D1FC2E60C22EC133B7
MySQL323	0AFDA7C85EE805C2
MySQLSHA1	229749C080B28D3AEFAB78279C4668E6E12F20FA
Cisco PIX	RtJk8qcKDPR.2D/E
VNC Hash	DAD3B1EB680AD902

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Large Web Applications Incidents

- "RockYou" - passes stored in **plain-text** in database. SQL Injection. Millions of plain-text Facebook/MySpace passwords obtained.

- "Gawker" - Database obtained – ~750,000 User password hashes obtained (Salted DES)

- Rootkit.com – Database Backup Obtained - ~58000 User Password Hashes (Raw MD5)

- "Xiaozhi" - DataBase Attacked – 1.06 Million Password Hashes (SHA Variant)

- Unnamed Financial Site – ~5 Million User Password Hashes obtained (raw MD5)

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
HEX - Hash EXchange

Hash EXchange!

About

Here you can browse cracked hashes, download left hashes and upload found hashes.

Lists

list	download	type	found	left	total	progress	dictionary	comments	upload
airsoft		md5	7,006	141	7,147	98.03%			
carders		md5(md5(pass).salt)	2,214	6,211	8,425	26.28%			
fcolimpia		mysql64	3,726	630	4,356	85.54%			
freehackforumall		md5(md5(pass).salt)	25,335	16,390	41,725	60.72%			
gamepassion		md5	2,944	38	2,982	98.73%			
gawkers		des	674,690	69,174	743,864	90.7%			
hellbound		md5	5,949	277	6,226	95.55%			
inbookmark		md5	2,101	229	2,330	90.17%			
jaillords		md5	2,348	94	2,442	96.15%			
███████		md5	3,884,294	1,524,125	5,408,419	71.82%			
phpbb		md5	186,127	3,540	189,667	98.13%			
rootkit		md5	54,372	4,303	58,675	92.67%			
scrollwars		md5	11,570	369	11,939	96.91%			
tntvillage		md5	36,154	1,681	37,835	95.56%			
twilight-disorder		md5	5,079	98	5,177	98.11%			
wsgifts		md5	2,798	70	2,868	97.56%			
xiaozhi		sha256	1,068,680	729,782	1,798,462	59.42%			

Done

The Theory (OWASP)

Internet-based web-application passwords always suck. OWASP should fix this.

Passwords on the web are worse because sites on the Internet do not:
    1) Force password complexity
    2) Require/Force passwords changes/rotation
    3) Educate their users

Password cracking tools are mostly tested to work against these subpar passwords – and not against passwords chosen against password complexity (and rotation) policies

Password cracking tools/techniques must be improved in order to crack the "stronger" passwords that are created against complexity rules.

Once web applications on the Internet start encrypting their hashes with stronger formats, and start educating/forcing their users to choose better passwords – the default tools will not work as well – and their users will be "safer"..... for now.

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Tools

Password Cracking Tools:

1) John the Ripper (Our preference - Today's Topic)
2) HashCat / OCLHashCat / OCLHashCat+ (Recommended Tools)

3) SAMInside - Dictionary section has extremely basic rules (Approx 10)
   Prepend 1-2 characters - Append 1-2 characters.
4) L0phtCrack 6 - "Strong Password Audit - "common modifications"
   consists of Prepending and/or Appending 2 characters.
5) ophcrack - Rainbow Tables Based - Brute Force
6) PasswordsPro - Supports the MOST formats of all tools
   Very slow to load input files with multiple passwords
   Actually has a "Rules.txt" file very simular to John the Ripper -
   these rules are also almost as good as John's default ruleset.
   Costs Money. (Approx $54 USD).
7) Cain/Abel - Free - Has really basic rules (reverse, Double, Case
   Subs, 2 numbers append, l33t rules)

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Tools – HashCat / OCLHashCat

HashCat / OCLHashCat /OCLHashCat+ (Recommended Tools)

- Hashcat is "closed source" (but free)
- Automatically takes advantage of all cores/cpus (great for multi-core systems)
- Has "rules" that are semi-compatible with John the Ripper
- Under constant development
- Very active IRC/Message-board based user-base
- Supports large amounts of formats (NTLM, SHA, MD5)
- Not as "user friendly" as other tools – expect a learning curve

- OCLHashCat uses GPU cards (ATI / NVidia) and can be used to build incredibly powerful systems for very little $$$

- The HashCat team won KoreLogic's 2010 "Crack Me If You Can" password cracking contest at DEFCON

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Tools - John the Ripper

John the Ripper (JtR):

http://www.openwall.com/john/
http://www.openwall.com/john/doc/

Mailing List:
http://marc.info/?l=john-users&r=1&w=2

"John the Ripper is a fast password cracker, currently available for many flavors of Unix (11 are officially supported, not counting different architectures), Its primary purpose is to detect weak Unix passwords."

It is free, it is open source, it is constantly under development.

A team based around JtR came in 3rd and 4th place in "Crack Me If You Can" password cracking contest at 2010 DEFCON.

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John Usage

Examples of Usage:

john /etc/shadow
john --wordlist=password.lst --rules passwd
john --show passwd

Loaded 17461 password hashes with no different salts (NT)
test   (username1)
password   (username2)
password1   (username3)
123456   (username4)
qwerty   (username5)
baseball   (username6)

How it works

Yes it cracks passwords, but how?

1) Uses a wordlist (supplied with the tool).

2) Uses a wordlist combined with "rules" that manipulate the wordlist.

3) Brute forces password possibilities based on statistics generated by the primary developer (and older tools).

These are roughly the same ideas that all password cracking software packages use

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Problems with these methods

Problems with these methods:

1) Default wordlist is small/outdated/mostly based on statistics of extremely weak passwords.

Wordlists for all tools are not based on recent password statistics.
Also, not based on passwords used in "Corporate" environments.
OWASP: The default wordlists_do_ work pretty good on web users

Publicly available wordlists are also not based on recent password statistics.
    Klingon? Swahili? Esperanto ? No one uses these.

Even if you use real password statistics, from where? Do people on Facebook choose better or worse passwords than internal corporate networks? (Example: RockYou).
–   **OWASP: Find the 'RockYou' list – it will crack TONS of Internet based hashes**

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Problems with these methods

Problems with these methods (cont):

2) Rules are based upon statistics gained from a limited data pool. This data is old/outdated. Appear to be based on techniques used by users in the 1990s. Users today are choosing much more complex patterns. Users are forced to choose more complicated passwords because of password policies.

3) The Brute Force file (all.chr) is based on outdated passwords lists. All.chr contains statistics about letters/letter combinations used in previous passwords. These statistics will <u>not</u> quickly match your password statistics for your users in the 2010s.

So, lets crack some passwords…

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Today's Examples

About today's examples:

Password file used: pwdump.txt (Format NTLM – From an Windows Active Directory)

This is a file containing 32883 valid hashes from a mythical single company.

This company uses strict password policies that enforce complexity rules.
> Upper Case - Lower Case - and Numbers are required.

> Special Characters are <u>highly</u> encouraged by security staff (but not enforced).

OWASP: Does your web-site do this? Why not...?

John's Default Wordlist

What can 'john' do by default:

john --format:nt -w:password.lst pwdump.txt
Loaded 32883 password hashes with no different salts (NT)

Example of cracked passwords:

august	backup	baseball	blowfish	bluesky	austin
bridge	change	enterprise	football	front242	goldfish
health1	holiday	london	looney	password	patriots
research	security	services	station	stupid	sunshine
watson	winter	yellow	welcome		

guesses: 29 unique passwords found (101 actual accounts obtained, multiple accounts shared these passwords)

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John's Rules

Now with John's rules (notice the --rules):

john --rules --format:nt -w:password.lst pwdump.txt

Abcd1234	Abigail7	Alexander5	Allison9	Anthony9
Aragorn3	Arsenal1	Arsenal4	Asdf1234	Asterix9
Autumn1	Baseball3	Baseball6	Beaches1	Beautiful2
Belgium2	Belmont7	Benjamin3	Birthday6	Blessed1
Bonjour1	Bonjour2	Bonjour3	Dallas1	Dallas2
Dallas6	Passw0rd	Password1	Password2	Password3
Stingray2	Stingray?	Zachary2	april9 austin1	dallas2

guesses: 272 unique <u>new</u> passwords found (846 actual total accounts obtained)

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John's Rules (single)

Now with --single (a more advanced set of rules based around the username).

john --single --format:nt pwdump.txt

(Notice no wordlist/dictionary)

guesses: 1361 unique <u>new</u> passwords found (1462 actual total accounts obtained)

Munich09	Exchangeftp	Computer55	Summer55
London999	Orange123	mcafee	Project1
Dublin89	citrix2000	aug1999	Corporate1!!

John's Rules (single)

john --rules:single --format:nt -w:password.lst pwdump.txt
(This attempts passwords with rules based off of the wordlist
'password.lst' – This is a new "trick" not documented anywhere)

password	Yankees9	Sydney12	London33	baseball	Clippers9
London12	Michael22	football	Asterix9	Syntel12	Report22
sunshine	History9	Mercer12	Australia22	august	Holiday9
Cayman12	Test0123	welcome	Patriots9	Scudder23	Account09
backup	Redfish9	Munich23	security	Surfing9	Munich13
winter	Dolphins9	Market13	Dallas23	Tiffany9	Dallas13
London23	london	Trinity9	London13	Paris123	ireland123
Ireland09	London444		France888	newyork1!	hello123#
qwerty1!	Munich23	abcd1234%			

guesses: 1283 unique <u>new</u> passwords found (3645 actual new
accounts obtained. Multiple shared passwords)

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Completion of John's Rules

After all 4 steps are run, in this example we have:

3645 actual accounts with logins and passwords obtained.
'john' reports: 9980 password hashes cracked, 38921 left

This is because 6337 accounts had blank passwords (they were disabled accounts).

This is 20% of the entire password file cracked in a few short amount of time.

(approx: 120 seconds)

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So what's the problem?

So, what's the problem? You cracked 20% of the passwords and you are brute forcing the rest of the range. Wont you eventually get 99% done?   **Answer: Not even close!**

- You have barely scratched the surface of what users are <u>really</u> doing to generate passwords.
- You are also wasting CPU cycles by generating passwords that don't meet the known patterns that your users are using.
- You are also trusting the 'rules' inside of John the Ripper in order to discover patterns chosen by users.

What patterns we found using default settings:
1) Adding numbers on the end of passwords.
2) Capitalizing the first letter of each word
3) Adding a ! to the end of a Capitalized word
4) Adding 123
5) Variations on the Usernames (adding specials/numbers/etc).

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The problem with brute force

If you look at the output of :
john -i:all -stdout | head -n 1000000 | egrep [A-Z] | wc

This returns: 21655 passwords with a capital letter.

You will see that of the first 1,000,000 passwords attempted via brute-force, only 21,655 contain capital letters (2%) and 162 of them _start_ with a capital letter. (.01%)

But, of the 2235 unique passwords cracked so far, 1976 contain a capital letter (and 1975 of those 1976, _start_ with that capital letter). This represents 88% of the passwords cracked.

Why not take advantage of this statistic, and dig deeper into wordlists, and rules to crack more passwords?

OWASP: If your web site does not require a capital letter, even the most beginner password cracker will destroy your hashes!

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What did KoreLogic use?

Up to this point:
 9980 password hashes cracked, 38921 left

We can assume we will crack more and more passwords using "all.chr":

But we do <u>not</u> know how fast they will crack? So, why risk it?

Instead, using our rules/tricks/tips, KoreLogic was able to obtain the following stats:

43131 password hashes cracked, 5770 left

How did we do it?

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By looking for patterns! Examples:

ABla1109	Domi1236	July2006	Novb2009	Sept2010
AChw0708	Dons0117	July2007	Nove1234	Sept2012
AaKw2013	Doom2009	July2009	Nove2007	Sept7860
Aanu2009	Drue0802	July2021	Nove2008	Sepu2009
Abcd1234	Dune2001	July2498	Nove2009	Sepx2009
Abcz2009	Dyln0202	July6060	Novo2009	Sesp2010
Abhi1009	EHeh8888	June1984	Novs2009	Sfax2014
Acac3434	Edin1485	June2007	Novu2009	Shal1234
Adam1109	Edin2006	June2009	Novv2009	Shaw0709
Addi0204	Ekim2005	June2012	OCto2009	Shiu0209
Addi5678	Ekim2009	June2020	OOdd2233	

What patterns do you see?

Simple Pattern #1

Answer: [A-Za-z]{4}[0-9]{4} (Letters 4 times - then 4 Numbers)

The pwdump.txt example had 1575 accounts with a password that met this pattern (647 unique examples)

The most common passwords of which were:
144 Fall2010
139 Sept2010
 80 Octo2010
 49 Nove2010
 16 Augu2010
 12 July2010
 12 Dece2010

See another pattern? (Look at the letters used).

So in the previous example, if we had a rule that appended 4 numbers to the end of a password - We could crack *more* of these.

The original john.conf does <u>some</u> of these:

-[:c] (?a \p1[lc] Az"[1-9]\0\0" <+
l Az"19[7-96-0]" <+ >-
l Az"20[01]" <+ >-
l Az"19[7-9][0-9]" <+

But, who can read these rules?

So, we have identified a password pattern, and we want to make a rule that will search for <u>all</u> possible combination that fit that pattern.

How do we do it?

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Simple Pattern #1

We write our own rules in john.conf !

[List.Rules:KoreLogicRulesAppend4Num]
c$[0123456789]$[0123456789]$[0123456789]$[0123456789]
$[0123456789]$[0123456789]$[0123456789]$[0123456789]

The 'c' means - begin each try with a capital letter (remember our stats, 88% of the passwords started with a capital letter).

$[0123456789] Means add a 0 or 1 or 2 ... to the END of the string. ($ = END)

Example Output

```
# more foo.dic
test

# john -w:foo.dic --rules:KoreLogicRulesAppend4Num -stdout
Test0000 Test0001 Test0002 … (etc etc etc)
Test9998 Test9999 test0000
test0001 test0002 test 0003  ... (etc etc etc)
test9997 test9998 test9999
```

Notice: capital 'T' in the first 10000 tries
Notice: lower case 't' in the last 10000 tries

How to improve this more

How else can I improve this? Use better wordlists!

With KoreLogicRulesAppend4Num use:
1) All 4 letter words (this is fast)
http://www.justpain.com/ut_maps/wordlists/length04.txt

john -w:length04.txt --rules:KoreLogicRulesAppend4Num -format:nt   pwdump.txt

2) Create you own list of 4 letter words based upon words you've already seen (Remember the months we saw previously? Create a list of those)

3) All 4 letter combinations (aaaa aaab aaac .... zzzy zzzz) (slower)
     9,139,520,000 possible combinations

4) All 4 character combinations (0000 000a 000b ... !!!a !!!b .. @%!% ...)
     (This is really slow - but can be productive)

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Types of Wordlists

Remember:

There are lots of other wordlists you can try with this one rule:
1) default wordlist   2) 3 letter words/combinations
3) 5 letter words   4) wordlists from 3rd parties
5) custom wordlists created by you (Months? Seasons? Sports Teams? - See end of presentation).

With our example pwdump.txt the following command line:
 # john -w:4letters.dic --rules:KoreLogicRulesAppend4Num --format:nt pwdump.txt

We cracked an additional 597 unique passwords. (Totaling 1572 new accounts) This took roughly 27 minutes. Would be _much_ faster with the tool 'hashcat' or 'oclhashcat'

Now up to: 11552 password hashes cracked, 37349 left

Additional patterns used by users (and the rules to crack them):

New Pattern: Use of '1234'
The default john.conf adds '123' to the end of every word, but not 1234. And not at all positions.

1234!!@@12341234	1234pass	!QAZ1234		Pass1234
1234!@#	1234HIya	!Qwe1234	1234!@#$	1234Hacc
1234paul	##1234##	1234!PA	1234SU$	car1234
Pqrs1234$	1234Help.	$oct1234	1234*555	1234Qwer !
1234mrs	$Work1234	1234qwe	1234Harley	!1234Sunny
Smab1234%%		1234+++	1234Qwerty	1234password

Also, KoreLogic released rules that will also append it at the beginning, middle, end, etc of each word in our wordlist.

Users love using '123' as their numbers:

!Austin123	(summer123	123bali	1234Wipro@
123Austin$	123!Saints	123-Saints	123dani
123August$	!Elaine123	1!Brawn123	123dini
123August/	123Clipper!	123$$$	Photon1231!
Ferrari123	123roka123	August@123	Clippers#123
Jordan123	1samuel$123	August_123	$Dipesh123
Austin#123	whatuwant@123		whatwewant@123

In [List.Rules:Wordlist] - just add a line that says: $1$2$3

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Current Year

Current Year: Lots of users will use the current year as their number:

!Jan2010	2010!!	Work2010aha	May2010mjk	Sep2010mjk
020102mc	Alps2010!	ck2010ck	cl2010qt	Sept2010x
020104jo	Augu2010$		slm2010md	co2010je
2010!	Winter2010a		Jam2010sic	Pal2010mine

Same idea as previous rule, place 2010 at the beginning, middle, end.

[List.Rules:KoreLogicRulesAdd2010Everywhere]
i0[2]i1[0]i2[1]i3[0]
i1[2]i2[0]i3[1]i4[0]
i2[2]i3[0]i4[1]i5[0]
i3[2]i4[0]i5[1]i6[0]
i4[2]i5[0]i6[1]i7[0]
i5[2]i6[0]i7[1]i8[0]
i6[2]i7[0]i8[1]i9[0]

more foo.dic
abcd

john -w:foo.dic -stdout --rules:KoreLogicRulesAdd2010Everywhere
2010abcd
a2010bcd
ab2010cd
abc2010d
abcd2010

Use with wordlists <u>not</u> containing numbers. Just letters and specials.

Month/Year

Lets extrapolate this further, look at these sample passwords:

!Mar2010	$Aug2010	aug2010	1dec2010	@nov2010	$Mar2010
.Aug2010	!Jun2010	5dec2010	#nov2010	Jmar2010	=Aug2010
$Jun2010	DEC2010	$Nov2010	MAR2010	AUG2010	.Jun2010
Dec2010	%Nov2010	Mar2010	Aug2010	JUN2010	3nov2010
amar2010	Kaug2010	Jun2010	=Nov2010	!Aug2010	P_aug2010
	Ljun2010	@Nov2010			

These are based on Month/Year combinations.

If it is October of 2010, what do you think most of these passwords are going to be?

What about:

Jun2010! Lato2010!   Monkey2010!   Newyear2010! baby2010!
evg2010! Happy2010@   Nove2010   #password2010@

Hint: Use this with wordlists of letters only. 1-5 letters work best. (at first)
Why? Because we are supplying the numbers and special characters for you.

Prepending Years works as well:

2010!Sep   2010,Aug   2010octs* 2001Jeep   2010!   2010#
2010Jacob 2010ly!!   2001MARK2010!!   2010#dec   2001Papa
2010!.!.   2010$Hello 2010time   2001abcd 2010!Nov   2010$Oct
2010tiny   2001JUL   2001andy   2010!Nove 2010+november
2010oct*T 2001JUN   2010September   2010Toyota

Months

What about all these months we keep seeing? They aren't always at the beginning and end. They <u>can</u> be in the middle.

!Oct-2010	rnOct$	4Sep06	1983jan	1may1982
!Oct1006	wwOct05	1jan1191	1may1969	$Oct06!
!Sep06	CopSep1$	1jan1985	1may1976	$#Oct999	$$Sep123
1jan1993	05Oct$10	$1Sep05	augSep001	02may1977	27Oct2010
01jan	19835may	AmyOct!1	409Sep89	01jan184	921may6
29Sep87%	ACSep*123	Zq$$Sep9			

What about passwords that end with Month and/or Dates?

04282may	2006%May	BN@MAY2	.MAY77	Simon@may08	0606MAY
2006.May	Dan&May1	1971May05	janemay01	13126may	ily14May
capemay7	1MAY06	jkm@may22	14082may	1985may7	$21may70
2$MAY20	vd@may29	1976@May	1989may9	*09May08	EJBmay17
2006!May	1990may2	.MAY07	Emilymay07		

Months

What about passwords that have the _whole_ month in them:

January!12006	February2008=	April$0410	August/2008	October&11
January!2006	March#16	April*26th	August132008!	October/2010$$
January#2006	March#2008	June%&2011	SeptembeR2010	december97
January101994	March#3164	June!22004	Septem2010*	december98
January2010!	March031708	June/2007	September**123	december@01
February!2007	March142010	August*2010		

Also: 4 letter months

OCTO!!2	Octo!200	Octo2010!	Octob#10	Nove2005!
OCTO!01	Octo1957	Octo2010!!	octoocto	Nove2005*
OCTO!2	Octo1975	Octo2010$	NOVE!20	Nove2005-
OctO1008	Octo1998	Octo2010$$	NOVE&20	Nove2006
OctO2008$	Octo2**9	Octob!!05	Nove.2008	OctOct09
Octo200$	Octob!08	Nove.2010	Octo!!2005	Octo200%
Octob!23	Nove002.			

Days of the Week

Also: Days of the week:

MONDAY.	Monday#	Monday0915$	Friday*15
Thursday2.0	MONDAY/	Monday#01	Tuesday%$888
Friday.56	Thursday99=	MONDAY0	Monday#123
friday@2010	Thursday=01	Monday!23	TUESday180105

[List.Rules:KoreLogicRulesPrependDaysWeek]
i0[mM]i1[oO0]i2[nN]i3[dD]i4[aA4@]i5[yY]
i0[tT]i1[uU]i2[eE3]i3[sS]i4[dD]i5[aA4@]i6[yY]
i0[wW]i1[eE]i2[nN]i3[dD]i4[sS]i5[dD]i6[aA4@]i7[yY]
i0[tT]i1[hH]i2[uU]i3[rR]i4[sS]i5[dD]i6[aA4@]i7[yY]
....

Users Love Numbers

Users *love* numbers!

By default john.conf has multiple rules that add numbers to wordlists.
By default the following passwords can be cracked:

aaron698	windsor003	Aimhigh300	Austin934	Buster172
aaron699	welcome222	Alexis333	Austin958	Caitlin442
ababy420	welcome456	Alliecat789	Austin987	Accounting785

   and

ABcd4567	Abby0077	Amanda5878	ABcd5678	Abby0206
Antigua4444		ABcd6789	Abby0217	Antionette0824

By adding 3 or 4 numbers to the end of a wordlist.
But john.conf does not do this for all 3 or 4 numbers. Just a subset

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Users Love Numbers

So we need rules that do the <u>complete</u> list (as seen earlier in presentation):

[List.Rules:KoreLogicRulesAppend4Num]
c$[0123456789]$[0123456789]$[0123456789]$[0123456789]
$[0123456789]$[0123456789]$[0123456789]$[0123456789]

and

[List.Rules:KoreLogicRulesAppend3Num]
c$[0123456789]$[0123456789]$[0123456789]
$[0123456789]$[0123456789]$[0123456789]

Sample output (for Append4Num):

Abcd0000 Abcd0001 Abcd0002 Abcd9998 Abcd9999
abcd0000 abcd0001 abcd0002 abcd9998 abcd9999

Users Love Numbers

Prepending with 2 Numbers (notice the first capital letter):

00Brandon	01Bahadur	01Jaguars	01Otavalo	99Gretzky	00Presque
01Bigturd	01Jarrett	12Chucker	99Matthew	00Shootme	01Bilusha
01Kokonut	12Cowboys	99Monster	00Tiffany	01Buttons	01Latrice
12Cowboyz	00Welcome	01Megenza	13croatia	00Zamboni	01Hannahg
1Michael	13mandala	01Arianna	01Inferno	01Olimpia	13samurai

Prepending with 3 Numbers:

000Welcome	003Kenneth	009Bhuvana	434Western	866Rathman
001Bhuvana	003welcome	010Bhuvana	444Chelsea	888Welcome
001sanyika	004Bhuvana	012Brownis	444Kriszta	888Zachary
002Bhuvana	005welcome	100Alissar	456Cowboys	888userpwd
003Aisling	006welcome	100IMedley	456Macbook	003Bhuvana
007welcome	429Wedding	456Markske		

Users Love Numbers

Prepending with 4 Numbers:

1236weather	1921Wedding	3029Jessica	4119Fairway
8224Hunterz	1315Marvick	1928Lorenzo	3042Sfiling
4122Wolfsun	8231Incubus	1324Booglet	2007Chaunce
2049Kelibia	4144Carroll	9234Account	1513Brandon
2015Wedding	2060belmont	4166Buffalo	9234Cheengr
1522Salinas	2017Jasmine	2075Jasmine	5199Eturkey
1526Katelyn	2021WestGe	2101Wedding	5210Ansarah
1800troyboy	2023Jillian		

Prepend with 2 Numbers - Append 2 Numbers:

10Nico58	12cool12	56Moto97	20july83	55LOVE15
20Nori02	42csva07	01Polo86	30july95	85NIKE15
30PINK03	72cute92	46Quag17	12july99	45PAME15
40ango10	84baby12	0gamm12	50owen17	18amen02
50anna08	94bkjf41	60gary12	90paco12	48apoi89
70asis83	34cali14	30gfrc05	60paul17	

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Special Characters

Some password complexity rules requires users to use a special character in their password. Users treat these characters differently than letters, and use them sparingly.

Appending Special Characters:

thadeus!	antonio!	bubbles#	Californi@	CapeCoral@!
Simplyred!	FRANCE#	BonJovi@	dolphin,	Venice@!
Izabella!	GRANNY#	CITRIX@	cactus!@	change@!
NYGiants!	Student#	Computer@cheese!@		Cowboy@@
changeme!	abcdefg#	clover!@	cheese@@	Dancing!
badgirl#	Austin!@	Dreamcatcher@		Lovemybabies@

Special Characters

Also, *prepend* a word with special character(s):

!!autumn	@@EMILY	@!pq10MZ	!1Clipper	!1q1q1q1q !!
deanna	!!Terry08	@!qp10MZ	!1Jamie5	!1qaz2wsx
##archie	!!abc123	@!summer05	!1Jamie5	!4London
@!andrew	!!alex85	!1London	!8Monday	@#Winter
!!die4me	!0Passwo	!1Monster	!9London	@@August
!@1234A	!0babies	!1Rebecca	!Firefox24	@@DAVID
!@Cancer	!1Bridge	!1Sunny	!Linux01	@#summer07

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Additional "Specials" Patterns:
Append1_AddSpecialEverywhere:

Africa!1	AmyOct!1	Kar!dani1	XF!LES1	m!dnight1	Ahoney!1
Andyyu!1	john!deere1	abi!abi1	Alaya!1	AB!gail1	
T@Y!OR1	b@byg!r1	Amanda!1	A!lison1	We!come1	
S!LVER1	Amelia7!1	Ra!stlin1	Welcome!n1	S0lar!s1	

Append 2010Special:

oct2010!	Aug2010$	oct2010$	26Dec2010!	Aug2010@
oct2010@	2Cute2010!	october2010!	Aaron2010!	Dublin2010!
pats2010!	March2010!	eagles2010!	Asia2010#	eagles2010$
Brooklyn2010@		odessa2010$		Alyssa2010!
Homegirl2010$		Januarybaby2010!		

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Special Characters

Append4NumSpecial:

Abby1958$	Alex1005$	Andre7000!	August2008$	Chris0707$
Abcd1234!	Alex1109$	Athens2004$	August2008.	Abcd1234$
Alex1209!	April2007#	August2010!	Dece2010$	Abcd1234^
Alex2008!	August2008!	August2010$	Alex0908$	Alex2010!
August2008#		Canada2010!		

Append6NumbersSpecial:

sl553015!	uu124578!	iggy104215!	Fab240899!	Greg731133#
sl553016!	oct192010!	baby112108!	Feb020905!	ss201011!
ee124578!	Feb102010!	tt124578!	eric200509!	
Feb190207!	ty092906!	fall051684!	Fab240895!	
Grace291133!		Sherry123456!	Summer200810!	

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Special Characters

AppendNumberNumberSpecialSpecial:

AUTUMN08$$	Andrew49$$	Baby33!!	Cadillac44$$	January08$$
AUTUMN09$$	Aquaman12$$	Bold08$$	Dolfan00$$	Abcd16$$
AteO00..	Saints01$$	Emma08!!	Alex29$$	August09$$
Cadillac33@@	Football33@@	Alex33$$	Baby09!!	Cadillac33##
Henry23$$				

AppendSpecial4num:

Amy!2006	Aug#2010	Baby@0303	1nM@7352
Anala@2002	Aug@1826	Baby@1628	Anand@1980
Aug@2000	Dallas@2010	September@2005	11vaca@2006
Andrew@1	Aug@2004	mn@2008	11Fire@0601
alexandria!2010		September#2010	

Users also love finger patterns:

```
NHY^%tgb       qwe~123    !23qweasd !QWERTY  NHY^5tgb
!1234qwe        !@#$QWE  ASDFqwer qwertyqw  !123qwer
!@#123qwe      (123qwe)   ASDFqwer##          1qwe!QWE
%1QWertyuiop
```

1) john --external:keyboard (works, but is not perfect)
2) make your own (Or use KoreLogic's)

Sometimes during corporate training classes, they will tell users to use this method. Take advantage of this fact!

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Internet related (These work REALLY well on Internet Apps):

0900.com	1723.com	YaL@agf.com	KOM.NET	aafp.org
1395.com	17jm.com	gabriel.com	capi.net	woop.org
1828.com	1995.COM	@cox.net	ARMY.ORG	

Dev/Prod/Test/UAT Related:

Prod!111	prod@123	TEST-CO	test!ng	webtest
Prod!121	UAT$2109	TEST-DO	test-1234	Prod!131
Uat$1234	Test@1109	test.123	silktest	Prod=332
Uat$2010	Test@123	testftp	preprod1	Prod=666
TEST-CA	Test@cct	CFPTEST	preprod!	prod4321

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Previous Passwords as Dictionary

So you've used all these rules to crack some passwords, what else can you do?

Use your cracked password as a dictionary!
john -show --format:nt pwdump.txt | cut -d: -f 2 | sort -u > cracked.dic
or
cut -d: -f2 john.pot | sort -u > cracked.dic

This is especially useful if you have :
1) Hashes from multiple systems
2) Password history files - (or hashes from previous months/years).
3) Large amounts of users

OWASP: Use the 'rockyou' list against your hashes!

Reuse all the "rules" using the new cracked.dic as the wordlist.
Also..... (next slide)

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Search/Replace Rules:
John's default john.conf has <u>some</u> of these. We have improved them.

Numbers -> Specials:
Austin1 -> Austin!
Testing222222 -> Testing222@@@
Dallas9 -> Dallas(

Replace Numbers -> Other Numbers:

$Austin01	$Austin05	$Austin09	Austin!01	Austin!06
$Austin02	$Austin06	@Austin73	Austin!02	Austin!07
$Austin03	$Austin07	@Austin74	Austin!04	Austin!09
$Austin04	$Austin08	@Austin76	Austin!05	

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Replace Letters -> Other Letters

```
austin12    -> bustin12        austin21        -> dustin21
Austin37    -> Austin37        AUSTIN3         -> AUSTIN3
BOSTON1  -> DOSTON1            BOSTON1         -> FOSTON1
Austin11    -> Bustin11        Austin1$        -> Rustin1$
Austin08.  -> Tustin08.        Austin16.       -> Vustin16.
Password1-> Cassword1          Password#1      -> Wassword#1
password  -> bassword          password        -> cassword
```

Users will choose a password such as "Vegas2010" but when they are forced to change it – they will just change a single letter.

Example: Wegas2010 Vegaz2010

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Longest Passwords Cracked

Longest Passwords Cracked by KoreLogic:

Abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz 12345678901234567890
my chemical romance   representative2118
Robbiewilliams1234   happybirthday2005!
Prideandprejudice   communication2000
Astralprojection   cheesecake041004
Sleadministrator   Januarybaby2010!
Cheesecake041004   specialized7777
Rasheedwallace7   rememberthename
Waterville2008$ smartyjones2008

Do you see any pattern here that is super strong?

Do you see any pattern here that we haven't talked about?

WordLists

Wordlists:
- Having a variety of wordlists is required.
- KoreLogic has the most luck with the following lists:

Seasons - Months - Years - First Names - Last Names - Cities - States - Regions - Countries - "RockYou" List - Regions of India/China/USA - Religious references (books of the Bible, lists of Gods, etc) - keyboard combinations - 4 letter words - 5 letter words - 6 letter words - 7 letter words - Sports Teams - Colleges - Client specific words - Dates - Numbers - Common wordlists – Facebook Names List ('fbnames')
etc. etc.

Even without any new rules - these types of dictionaries are more likely to crack more passwords than the defaults.

KoreLogic has released a large set of wordlists that can be used with any password cracker you wish. http://contest.korelogic.com/

GPU Password Crackers

For a small amount of money (< $4000) you can build an amazing password cracking system using "off the shelf" video cards usually reserved for high-end gaming.

KoreLogic's system has 4 GTX 480 cards (Approx $500 each). Capable of cracking 6220 Million hashes a second

This is the "future" of high-end password cracking. (Note: New version of IE will use GPU processing power to render pages)

Formats Supported:
    NTLM (Windows / Active Directory)
    SHA/SSHA (LDAP Directory Format)
    MD5 (various variations)
    DES (Used by UNIX Systems).

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GPU Password Crackers

Brute force is _much_ easier with GPU systems (and much **much** faster).

OclHashCat ("best" GPU password cracking software) includes many tools for better/smarter/faster password cracking.

KoreLogic can identify 100% of all 8 character (or less) from an Active Directory (NTLM) in days using GPU cards. It used to takes weeks.

(What does your security policy have for its minimum length required of passwords? 8 is no longer enough, make it 9 or 10)

The winning team at our DEFCON contest, had 11 high-end GPU cards. This number is up to at least 16 now. Including one system with 6 high-end (liquid cooled) GPU cards in it.

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Conclusion

Running the default rules/wordlists/methods of what ever password cracking tool you use is <u>OK</u>. It's not going to hurt.

Using better rules/wordlists (based on actual password data) is better and more likely to crack additional passwords.

Why <u>not</u> improve the rules/wordlists/methods to crack better passwords?

Password complexity rules do _not_ make users choose "stronger" passwords.

Complexity rules encourages users to use patterns/tricks to remember the stronger passes. Abuse these patterns/tricks.

Password rotation _introduces_ new password patterns.

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OWASP Conclusion

Web applications do not even enforce password complexity! Why not ?

All this "logic" is overkill when cracking "Internet" passwords because users choose horrible passwords.

Web Applications should start enforcing password complexity **now** and catch up with Operating Systems

2 Factor in being pushed now – Google/PayPal/WoW. Get on it!

If the password hash format your application uses is **not** support by John/HashCat/OclHashCat – how are people going to crack them?

Please use 'bcrypt' to hash your passwords!!

Mitigation

1) User Awareness. Make you users aware that you know what they are doing.   It is better to train them. Tell them to stop using Month/Years/Seasons in the passwords.

•Tell them what makes a better password. (Length, Randomness, Special characters in the <u>middle</u> of the password).

2) Technology: Make your password complexity requirements aware of these patterns. Users should not be allowed (by both Policy and Technology) from using these patterns/wordlists.

3) Routinely Audit passwords.
   This used to be a "no no" in corporate environments.
   Now, its a 'yes yes'. Ask for help.

   Learn what patterns your users are using.

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OWASP/Web Application Mitigation

1) User Awareness. Make you users aware that you know what they are doing. Train them to choose better passwords:

- Google Technique – JavaScript

2) 2-Factor (PayPal / Google / WoW)

3) Do not allow users to use CERTAIN passwords (Twitter Method)

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Ideas for Improvement

Ideas for improvement:
Make a "free lunch" contest for all users whose password do not crack with 24 hours.

    In the announcement of the contest, teach/train users about methods for creating complex "uncrackable" password patterns.

Example: "Chunk Norris is gonna beat! you up" → cnIGB!Yup
Example: "Oh, I see you ate one too" → oh,IcU812
Example: "who?WHAT?when?" → who?WHAT?when?
Example: "Something under the bed is drooling!" → "5u+B!drl"
Example: "NeverGonnaGiveYouUp" → nvrGONNA!!givu.
Example: "Wow, I was impressed with KoreLogic" -> "\/\/0w,KoreRules"   ;)

This combination of incentive, testing, prevention, auditing, and training will help your organization create stronger passwords.

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Events

Previous Events:

Defcon 2010 - KoreLogic sponsored a password cracking contest. 54,000 hashes were released, and teams had 48 hours   to crack as many as possible. $1,000 in prizes.

Details/Stats/Results here: http://contest.korelogic.com/

Upcoming Events:

DEFCON 2011 – 'Crack Me If You Can' Contest:

DerbyCon 2011 – New Security Conference in Louisville, KY. KoreLogic will be present. Possibly running a mini-contest for all password crackers.

Questions?

Read:
http://contest.korelogic.com/
for all wordlists/tips/tricks/rules/examples/etc

http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/
authentication/simple-formula-strong-passwords-sfsp-
tutorial_1636

Q &A :
Rick Redman – KoreLogic

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