

# Mobile Security

for the forgetful




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# Me

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# Client-side mobile attacks





Lost and stolen computers account for a quarter of lost data



# Stealing a phone

A demonstration



# What's on your phone?

- Contacts
- Call history
- Photos
- Text messages

# What's on your smartphone?

- Email
- Social networking
- GPS
- Mobile banking
- Corporate VPN
- Just about anything else you can think of



**But my phone is password-protected!**



# Bypassing a password

A demonstration



# Caveats





But I can remotely wipe my phone!



# Faraday Cage



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# Faraday Cage



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At least they won't be able to pose as  
me.



# Cloning



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




# Cloning







# Spoofing identifiers



# Weaponizing the Android Emulator

- Blog post forthcoming
- [https://github.com/SecurityCompass/android\\_emulator\\_spoofing](https://github.com/SecurityCompass/android_emulator_spoofing)




# The enemy can

- Access the filesystem
- Decompile and read your code
- Use remote debugging to:
  - Access memory at runtime
  - Step through code branches

# An Aside





Earlier: we made the phone accept any password.  
Is that an issue?



Hi Maxim,

Thank you for your note.

An attacker with the ability to modify `/data/system/gesture.key` already has root access on the phone. They can do much more damage to a phone than disabling or nulling out the screen unlock. The attack scenerios described already assume a compromised device.

Regards,

Nick

The Android Security Team

**Our Goal:**  
**Root Access != Game Over**



# What can you do?

## As a developer




# Encrypt data at rest

(Or not to store anything)



# Encryption is hard






# Military grade encryption



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# Military grade encryption

begin pgp private key block

www.google.com/search?sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=-----BEGIN+PGP+PRIVATE+KEY+BLOCK-----#q=BEGIN+PGP+PRIVATE+KEY+BLOCK+ filetype%3...

pinboard PwnYouTube Bookma Subscribe in NewsBlu Other B

Web Images Videos Maps News Shopping Mail more

maxim@ontoillogical.com

BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK filetype:asc

About 117 results (0.09 seconds) Advanced search

Everything Images Videos News Shopping More

All results Related searches More search tools

**PGP Security Logo - Newkirk**  
-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGP 6.5.3  
IQHPBEGY1VkrBADoa10PJ6wz/i4LZJvuvzto1YE2fvmKpKn8X62b+mbyBg8Ustr/Z ...  
[www.newkirk.com/newkirk.asc](http://www.newkirk.com/newkirk.asc) - Cached - Similar

**-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.1 ...**  
-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.1 Int. for non-commercial use <<http://www.pgpinternational.com>> ...  
[incat-ruhr.de/INCAT.Bochum.asc](http://incat-ruhr.de/INCAT.Bochum.asc) - Cached - Similar

**-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU ...**  
-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.6 (GNU/Linux)  
IQHhBEf4z1ERBACitU0+j5WIPWwJu2psiM6Tq61dp+wkmdib7Tz5SsKNLdwr+BOM ...  
[www.cryphon.org/cryphon.asc](http://www.cryphon.org/cryphon.asc) - Cached - Similar

**Frank Hessemer - Neue Seite 1**  
-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.8 for non-commercial use ... K/rgsxyens+fQB0+Dg== =wsL0 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----  
[frank-hessemer.de/pgp/hess.asc](http://frank-hessemer.de/pgp/hess.asc) - Cached - Similar

**ietf-registrar-sec.asc - Internet Engineering Task Force**  
-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGP 6.5.8  
IQOgA0GPxfkAAAEIANxKIRbzxNQb+wgl3qVtkAIAY9kEev31EBK//4PFrzj8BNKI ...  
<https://svn.tools.ietf.org/svn/tools/.../ietf-registrar-sec.asc> - Cached - Similar


**here - Home Page**  
-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGP Personal Security 7.0.3  
IQcoBDyZzdYBEACvJizr/baKplEaiLc1X9HCovHqVw+q8oquliq+AX6DpLQjhVTa ...  
[powerpole.ca/images/Jakub%20Mamos.asc](http://powerpole.ca/images/Jakub%20Mamos.asc) - Cached - Similar

# Military grade encryption



# Where do you put keys?





One answer is PBE (PKCS #5)



...Or not to store  
anything.



# Don't trust the hardware





# What can we do?

As the security community



# OWASP Mobile Security

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/  
OWASP\\_Mobile\\_Security\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project)

# Develop guidelines

Encrypting data at rest



# Develop guidelines

Defensive mobile coding



# Develop guidelines

Mobile incident response






# What can you do?

As a user





This is how we mitigate the risk of stolen laptops

# Tell Android I sent you!

- <http://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=10809>
- <http://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=11211>



# Full disk encryption

WhisperCore  
limited phone support  
beta



# Be careful!



# Photos

- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/ripper/273262947/>
- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/boyce-d/5096202428/>
- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/arselectronica/5056212669/>
- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/robnwatkins/397488557/>
- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/miiitch/4880022048/>
- <http://www.flickr.com/photos/moxiemarlinspike/4730390878/>



# Questions?

- max@securitycompass.com
- @mveytsman (I'm a sporadic twitter user, but trying to change)