NoScript, CSP and ABE: When The Browser Is Not Your Enemy

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Who Am I?

✓ Software developer
✓ Hacker
✓ Firefox contributor
✓ Member of the Mozilla Security Group
✓ Author of the NoScript browser add-on
✓ NoScript user ;}
Can Browser Tech Mitigate WebApp Vulns?

**Before NoScript**

No, it cannot: they’re server-side issues.

We can only wait for web devs to fix them.
Can Browser Tech Mitigate WebApp Vulns?

Before NoScript

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We can only wait for web devs to fix them.

After NoScript

Well, it might... It can... It should!
Web developers still need to fix bugs and develop safely, but browser technology can and should help users to stay safer.
## Timeline of Proactive Browser Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Feature Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1995</td>
<td>Same origin policy (Netscape 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1997</td>
<td>Security Zones (MSIE 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>Easy whitelisting (NoScript 1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2007</td>
<td>Site specific preferences (Opera 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2007</td>
<td>Client-side anti-XSS protection (NoScript 1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 2008</td>
<td>Mainstream in-browser XSS filter (MSIE 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2008</td>
<td>Client-side anti-Clickjacking (NoScript 1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2009</td>
<td>Server-driven anti-Clickjacking (MSIE 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 2009</td>
<td>Client-side anti-CSRF (NoScript’s ABE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2009</td>
<td>More XSS in-browser protection (Chrome 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2009</td>
<td>1st CSP-enabled experimental Firefox build</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Beyond the Same Origin Policy

- Guarding Cookies and JavaScript since 1995
- The only universal active content restriction for one decade
- Circumvented through:
  - Browser bugs
  - Plugin bugs
  - Web application flaws (XSS, CSRF, Clickjacking...)
- Easily compromised by careless mashups
Disabling Active Content

**Pros:**

- Default mitigation for most unpatched vulnerabilities in browsers & plugins
- Narrows the attack surface
- Prevents casual browsing surprises
Disabling Active Content

Pros:
- Default mitigation for most unpatched vulnerabilities in browsers & plugins
- Narrows the attack surface
- Prevents casual browsing surprises

Cons:
- Many modern websites don’t work properly
- Some web application security features are disabled as well (e.g. frame busting)
- Users will work against this policy
Enters NoScript...

- Default deny, easy allow
- Never blocks users with modal prompts
- Does not encourage “allowing everything”
- Makes mixed origins explicit
- Emulated JavaScript navigation
- Scriptless frame-busting
- Surrogate scripts
- One-click activation for embeddings
NoScript’s Main UI

Using NoScript with Firefox

Hello, you either have JavaScript turned off or an old version of Adobe’s Flash Player. Get the latest Flash player.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ 107 ratings
65,070 views

Facebook Live Spaces MySpace

(more share options)

Statistics & Data

Video Responses (1)

Sign in to post a Video Response

View All - Play All

Text Comments (75) Options

Sign in to post a Comment

About NoScript
Options...
 Allow scripts Globally (dangerous)
 Allow all this page
 Temporarily allow all this page
 Recently blocked sites
 Untrusted

Allow ytmg.com
Temporarily allow ytmg.com

Forbid youtube.com

Scripts Currently Forbidden

Done

URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B7K5S1

jorowi

August 15, 2006
(more info)

Given the recent announcement about the ability to scan and penetrate networks using javascript code, I thought I would upload a video showing how to install and use NoScript with Firefox. You can...
NoScript and Embedded Content (UI)

Blocked objects can be activated by clicking their placeholder.
NoScript and Embedded Content (Options)

The options will take effect on new or (manually) reloaded pages:
- Forbid Java™
- Forbid Adobe® Flash®
- Forbid Microsoft® Silverlight™
- Forbid other plugins
- Forbid <AUDIO> / <VIDEO>
- Forbid <IFRAME>
- Forbid <FRAME>
- Apply these restrictions to whitelisted sites too
- Block every object coming from a site marked as untrusted
- Show placeholder icon
- No placeholder for objects coming from sites marked as untrusted
- Ask for confirmation before temporarily unblocking an object
- Collapse blocked objects
- ClearClick protection on pages...
- Untrusted trusted
- Opacize embedded objects on pages...
- Untrusted trusted
NoScript’s Anti-XSS Protection

✓ Filters suspect requests (both JavaScript and HTML injections)
✓ UI is not modal and neutralization is not blocking
✓ Allows users to override (“Unsafe Reload”)
✓ Works against all kinds of non-persistent XSS attacks (including DOM-based ones) and HTML injections
MSIE 8’s XSS Filter

✓ Patches suspect responses (may add vulnerabilities)
✓ UI is not modal and neutralization is not blocking (impressively resembling NoScript, albeit with less rich UI)
✓ Allows server to override
✓ Does not work against DOM-based attacks and scriptless HTML injections
Chrome 4’s XSS Filter

✓ Checks scripts in response against request fragments
✓ No UI
✓ Disables JavaScript on suspect pages (blocking neutralization, may be exploited to force a scriptless page)
✓ Allows server to override (same mechanism as MSIE 8)
✓ Does not work against DOM-based attacks and scriptless HTML injections
✓ Many bypasses found so far
# Client-side XSS Protection Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NoScript</th>
<th>MSIE</th>
<th>Chrome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type 0</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type 1</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type 2</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HTML</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UI</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-blocking</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Server override</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>User override</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Content Security Policy (CSP)

Overview

- Declarative server-driven anti-XSS framework
- May require massive website changes
- Policies are pushed through HTTP headers
- Idea by RSnake, Design & Implementation by Mozilla (G. Markham, B. Sterne, S. Stamm)
- Just an experimental build so far, but interest from Microsoft and other parties
- Partially overlapping with other proposals (e.g. X-Frame-Options and Strict-Transport-Security)
Content Security Policy (CSP)

Features

- Effective against Persistent and Non-Persistent XSS (except DOM-based)

- Allows site admins and developers to:
  - Restrict JavaScript execution on the page, either totally or by disabling inline scripts and runtime evals
  - Specify script, stylesheet, media and embedding sources which are allowed for inclusion (whitelist)
  - Restrict frame hierarchies (like X-Frame-Options)
  - Force HTTPS (like Strict-Security-Transport)

- Reports violations to a configurable URL
Content Security Policy (CSP)

Deployment

- Each HTTP response must include one or more `X-Content-Security-Policy` headers.

- The following restrictions are enforced (possibly requiring scattered page code changes):
  - No inline script block or event handler attribute
  - No runtime string evaluation (`eval()`, `new Function()`, `setTimeout()`/`setInterval()`...)
  - No `javascript:`/`data:` URIs

- Scripts from whitelisted sources must be served with `content-type application/(javascript|json)`
Content Security Policy (CSP)

Directives

- `allow` *(defines default for all types)*
- `options` *(inline-scripts/eval-scripts)*
- `img-src`
- `media-src`
- `script-src`
- `object-src`
- `frame-src`
- `font-src`
- `xhr-src`
- `frame-ancestors`
- `style-src`
- `report-uri`
- `policy-uri`

✓ Multiple headers/directives intersection
✓ `X-Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only`
✓ HTTPS enforcement (superseded by STS)
Content Security Policy (CSP)

Policy samples

- **Example 1:** Site wants all content to come from its own domain:
  
  ```text
  X-Content-Security-Policy: allow 'self'
  ```

- **Example 2:** Auction site wants to allow images from anywhere, plugin content from a list of trusted media providers, and scripts only from its server:
  
  ```text
  X-Content-Security-Policy: allow 'self'; img-src *; object-src media1.com media2.com *.cdn.com; script-src trustedscripts.example.com
  ```

- **Example 3:** Admins want to deny all 3rd-party scripts for the site, and a project group also wants to disallow media from other sites:
  
  ```text
  X-Content-Security-Policy: allow '*'; script-src 'self'
  X-Content-Security-Policy: allow '*'; script-src 'self'; media-src 'self';
  ```

- **Example 4:** Online payments site wants to force all of the content in its pages to be loaded over SSL (should be much better using STS):
  
  ```text
  X-Content-Security-Policy: allow https://*:443
  ```
Strict Transport Security (STS)

- W3C draft proposed by Paypal
- Implemented by NoScript, soon by Chrome, interest from other browser vendors (Microsoft, Mozilla)
- Both Paypal and Ali Baba are deploying it
- Very simple yet effective

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

NoScript can also force HTTPS on user-choosen sites
Application Boundary Enforcer (ABE)

Overview

- Declarative anti-CSRF mechanism
- Both user-driven and server-driven
- Rules priority: SYSTEM, USER, Subscriptions, Site
- https://domain.com/rules.abe
- Simple firewall-like rules definition syntax
- Open source specification and reference implementation
- Currently available as a NoScript component, it can be implemented as a proxy or a server-side component as soon as CORS is finalized and adopted by browsers
Application Boundary Enforcer (ABE)

Rules definition syntax

Site <resource> [ <resource> ... ]
<action> [ <method> ... ] [ from <resource> [ <resource> ... ] ]
[ <action> [ <method> ... ] [ from <resource> [ <resource> ... ] ]
... ]

- **Resource**: either an URL pattern (glob, regexp), LOCAL, SELF, or ALL (*)

- **Action**: either Accept, Deny, Anon(ymize), or Sandbox

- **Method**: either a “real” HTTP method, or SUB, or ALL (default)
Application Boundary Enforcer (ABE)

Ruleset example

```
# This one guards the LAN, like Local Rodeo (a SYSTEM rule in NoScript)
Site LOCAL
Accept from LOCAL
Deny
# This rule defines normal application behavior, allowing hyperlinking
# but not cross-site framing and POST requests altering app status
Site *.somesite.com
Accept POST SUB from SELF https://secure.somesite.com
Accept GET
Deny
# This one guards logout, which is foolish enough to accept GET and
# therefore we need to guard against trivial CSRF (e.g. <img>)
Site www.somesite.com/logout
Accept GET POST from SELF
Deny
# This one strips off any authentication data (Auth and Cookie headers)
# from requests outside the application domains, like RequestRodeo
Site *.webapp.net
Accept ALL from *.webapp.net
Anonymize
```
Application Boundary Enforcer (ABE)

Deployment

- SYSTEM ruleset, built-in (currently containing just the LocalRodeo replacement rule)
- USER ruleset, customizable by users
- Subscription rulesets, updated daily from remote trusted sources
- Site rulesets (rules.abe), loaded before first HTTPS request and cached for one day (at least) or more (if cache-affecting headers say so)
- Why a file (log spam) rather than headers? CSRF needs to be blocked before the request reaches the server: we just can’t wait for a response header...
**Application Boundary Enforcer (ABE)**

**Processing**

- Processing order: SYSTEM, USER, Subscriptions, Site
- Each ruleset is processed top to bottom *until first match* (permissive exceptions should go higher than restrictions)
- On permissive or non-fatal outcome (*Accept*, *Anon*, *Sandbox*) processing resumes with next ruleset
- On restrictive fatal outcome (*Deny*) request is cancelled and processing aborted
Clickjacking protection

ClearClick (NoScript)

NoScript is Free Software (GPL), but if you find it useful, you can donate.

As you probably know the fewer sites you allow to install software and safer your browsing will be.
The only site you should have in your whitelist for addons installed happens for an “out of the box” Firefox). Therefore the link below to cycle between the obstructed and the clear version.

Potential Clickjacking / UI Redressing Attempt!
NoScript intercepted a mouse or keyboard interaction with a partially hidden element. Click on the image below to allow active content to run only from sites you trust.

Stable AMO Version, see:
https://addons.mozilla.org/n-US/firefox/addon/722/

Keep this element locked (recommended)

ClearClick protection on pages... untrusted trusted

Add to Firefox

Version 1.9.9.14
Works with Firefox: 1.5 – 3.7a1pre
Updated October 27, 2009

OWASP-Italy Day IV - 6th, Nov 09

OWASP
Clickjacking Protection

**X-Frame-Options (MSIE)**

![X-Frame-Options Demo](image_url)
Clickjacking Protection

X-Frame-Options (Chrome)
Clickjacking Protection

X-Frame-Options (NoScript)
Clickjacking Protection

Other

- CSP’s `frame-ancestors` directive (next Firefox)
- ABE’s SUB action (NoScript)
- JavaScript framebusting

Developer?

Deploy X-Frame-Options + JavaScript framebusting (caveat)

User?

Use NoScript
References

ABE, http://noscript.net/abe

Giorgio Maone, http://maone.net