AST07 — Update Drift
Severity: Medium
Platforms Affected: All
Description
Skills are installed and forgotten. Without immutable pinning and automated update verification, deployed skills drift out of sync with known-good versions — either because patches are not applied (leaving known vulnerabilities open) or because auto-update mechanisms blindly apply upstream changes that may themselves be malicious.
Why It’s Unique to Skills
Package update drift is a known risk in traditional software. In skills, it’s amplified by two factors: (1) skills are often installed by individuals without enterprise patch management, and (2) a “fix” version of a skill is itself unverifiable without cryptographic pinning — the attacker can push a “v1.0.1” that looks like a patch but contains a new payload.
Real-World Evidence
- ClawJacked (CVE-2026-28363, CVSS 9.9) and the broader OpenClaw CVE cluster (9 CVEs, 3 with public exploit code): the patch-lag window between disclosure and user update created an active exploitation window. SecurityScorecard confirmed 12,812 OpenClaw instances exploitable via RCE at time of analysis.
- Claude Code CVE-2025-59536: fixed in v1.0.111 (Oct 2025); CVE-2026-21852: fixed in v2.0.65 (Jan 2026). Gap of months between fix and public disclosure — users unaware of risk for the duration.
- OpenClaw’s hot-reload
SkillsWatcherenables real-time skill updates: a compromised upstream skill repository becomes instantly active without requiring agent restart. - Air Security, SkillJacking (Jul 2, 2026): published skills can be taken over outright — the most popular video-generation skill on skills.sh (11,483 installs) served its files live from a GitHub repo whose owner account had been deleted; researchers re-registered the username and controlled what every install received from that moment on. Victims needed no update to be affected — just one more use. In total, 925 skills (~134K agents) sat on such instantly hijackable sources, and the takeover itself tripped no scanner.
- Air Security, The Circus of Skills (Jun 24, 2026): 17,822 skills (~12.4% of 142,836 scanned; 6.7M installs) rest on at least one untrusted external resource — including binaries fetched from a repo’s
releases/latest— content that can drift malicious underneath a deployed skill without any version change or update event.
Attack Scenarios
Malicious Update
Trusted skill author’s account is compromised; attacker pushes v2.0 with a payload. Auto-updating agents receive it silently.
Patch-Lag Exploitation
CVE is disclosed; attacker weaponizes it before users patch. 12,812 instances exploitable in the OpenClaw case.
Rollback Attack
Attacker forces a downgrade to a known-vulnerable version via dependency resolution manipulation.
Hot-Reload Abuse
Skill directory is writable; attacker modifies SKILL.md mid-session; agent picks up changes without restart.
Preventive Mitigations
- Pin all installed skills to immutable content hashes (
sha256:), not version ranges. - Require cryptographic signature verification on every update — refuse unsigned updates.
- Implement a “freeze” mode for production deployments; prohibit hot-reload in non-development environments.
- Subscribe to registry security advisories and auto-alert on CVE matches for installed skills.
- Enforce a human-in-the-loop approval step for any skill update in enterprise environments.
- Maintain an inventory of installed skills with version, hash, and last-verified timestamp.
OWASP Mapping
- LLM03 (Supply Chain)
- CWE-1329 (Reliance on Component Without Verification)
- ASVS V14.2 (Dependency)
MAESTRO Framework Mapping
| MAESTRO Layer | Layer Name | AST07 Mapping |
|---|---|---|
| Layer 4 | Deployment & Infrastructure | insecure update pipelines, config drift |
| Layer 6 | Security & Compliance | update policy, verification enforcement |
| Layer 7 | Agent Ecosystem | cross-registry trust and update governance |
MAESTRO Layer Details
- Layer 4: Deployment & Infrastructure - unsafe automatic update and runtime drift.
- Layer 6: Security & Compliance - requirements for signed updates, patch policy.
- Layer 7: Agent Ecosystem - registry trust and cross-platform update consistency.
Cross-References
- AST01 (Malicious Skills): Update drift can introduce malicious code through compromised updates.
- AST02 (Supply Chain Compromise): Unverified updates are a supply chain attack vector.
- AST04 (Insecure Metadata): Update metadata may be spoofed to hide malicious changes.
- AST05 (Untrusted External Instructions): Referenced external content can drift maliciously with no version change to the pinned skill.
- AST08 (Poor Scanning): Updated skills may not be re-scanned, allowing new vulnerabilities.
- AST09 (No Governance): Lack of update policies enables uncontrolled drift.
References
- Snyk ToxicSkills
- Check Point Research: Caught in the Hook
- Oasis Security: ClawJacked (CVE-2026-28363)
- SecurityScorecard: 135,000+ OpenClaw instances exposed
- Air Security: SkillJacking
- Air Security: The Circus of Skills
Last updated: March 2026
Example
Put whatever you like here: news, screenshots, features, supporters, or remove this file and don’t use tabs at all.
Leadership & Founding Members
Project Leadership
Current Leaders
Ken Huang
Hammad Atta
Fabio Cerullo
Aonan Guan
Bhavya Gupta
Niv Hoffman
Iftach Orr
Akram Sheriff
AIVSS Distinguished Review Board
The OWASP AIVSS project’s Distinguished Review Board comprises world-renowned cybersecurity leaders, former government officials, and industry pioneers who provide strategic guidance and expert oversight for the AI Vulnerability Scoring System framework. We thank them for their guidance, several of whom have also supported this project’s work.
Rob Joyce
Advisor to PwC and OpenAI, Former Special Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity Coordinator
Jason Clinton
Deputy CISO, Anthropic
Amy R. Steagall
Chief Information Security Officer, Stanford University
Martin Stanley
AI Risk Management Framework Lead, NIST
Apostol Vassilev
Research Supervisor, NIST
Andrew Coyne
CISO, Banner Health, Former CISO, Mayo Clinic
Kevin Rocque
Managing Director/Executive Vice President, Global Technology Risk Officer, TD Bank
Jeff Williams
Former Global OWASP Chair, Founder and CTO, Contrast Security
Michael Tran Duff
University Chief Information Security and Data Privacy Officer, Harvard University
Emil Bender Lassen
Standards Lead, AIUC-1
Agentic Skills Top 10 Founding Members
Founding members of the OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 project itself — project leads, co-leads, and additional contributors — listed alphabetically. Several also contribute to the sibling OWASP AIVSS project listed above.
Ken Huang
Project Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10
Hammad Atta
Co-Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10
Manish Bhatt
Security Researcher, AWS
Fabio Cerullo
Co-Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10
David Girard
Senior Director, AI Security & AI Alliances, Trend Micro
Aonan Guan
Co-Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10
Bhavya Gupta
Co-Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10
Pamela Gupta
Founder & CEO, OutSecure / Trusted AI
Idan Habler
Staff AI/ML Security Researcher, Intuit
Niv Hoffman
CTO, Air Security
Charles Iheagwara
AI/ML Security Leader, AstraZeneca
Sushmitha Janapareddy
Director - Security Integrations, American Express
Edward Lee
Vice President, Lead AI Security, JP Morgan
KJ Lian
Senior Manager, Data & AI (Public Sector), AWS
Vineeth Sai Narajala
Application Security, AWS
Iftach Orr
Co-Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10
Kanna Sekar
Cyber Security, Google
Akram Sheriff
Co-Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10
Dennis Xu
Research VP, AI, Gartner
OWASP AIVSS Founding Members
The OWASP AIVSS (Agentic AI Vulnerability Scoring System) project is a sibling OWASP initiative focused on scoring the severity of agentic AI vulnerabilities. Its founding members are recognized here as OWASP founding members in the agentic AI security space; many of them have also contributed directly to the Agentic Skills Top 10 project’s research and review process.
Sunil Agrawal
Chief Information Security Officer, Glean
David Ames
Partner, PwC
Michael Bargury
Founder and CTO, Zenity
Joshua Beck
Application Security Architect, SAS
Manish Bhatt
Security Researcher, Amazon Kuiper Security
Mark Breitenbach
Security Engineer, Dropbox
Anat Bremler-Barr
Professor of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University
Siah Burke
HIPAA Security Officer, Siah.ai
David Campbell
AI Security, Scale AI
Ying-Jung Chen
AI safety researcher, PhD, Georgia Institute of Technology
Anton Chuvakin
Security Solution Strategy, Google
Jason Clinton
CISO, Anthorphic
Adam Dawson
Staff AI Security Researcher, Dreadnode
Leon Derczynski
Principal Research Scientist, NVIDIA
Walker Lee Dimon
AI Security Researcher, MITRE
Marissa Dotter
AI Security Researcher, MITRE
Dan Goldberg
ISO Market Lead, Omnicom
David Haber
CEO, Lakera
Idan Habler
Staff AI/ML Security Researcher, Intuit
Jason Haddix
Founder, Arcanum Information Security
Keith Hoodlet
Director of AI/ML & AppSec, Trail of Bits
Ken Huang
AIVSS Project Lead, OWASP
Chris Hughes
CEO, Aquia
Charles Iheagwara
AI/ML Security Leader, AstraZeneca
Krystal Jackson
Researcher, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, UC Berkeley
Sushmitha Janapareddy
Director - Security Integrations, American Express
Rob Joyce
Former Cybersecurity Director of NSA, Advisor to PwC, PwC
Diana Kelley
CISO, Noma Security
Prashant Kulkarni
Lead AI Security Research Engineer, Google Cloud
Mahesh Lambe
Founder, MIT, Unify Dynamics
Edward Lee
Vice President, Lead AI Security, JP Morgan
Nate Lee
CEO, Cloudsec.ai
Vishwas Manral
CEO, Precize.ai
Daniela Muhaj
Executive-in-Residence for Research & Development, AI 2030
Vineeth Sai Narajala
Application Security, AWS
Om Narayan
AI Security Researcher, AWS
Varun Pant
Engineering and Product Leader, AI applications at the Automated Reasoning Group, AWS
Advait Patel
Senior Site Reliability Engineer (DevSecOps + Cloud + AIOps), Broadcom, IEEE
Alex Polyakov
CEO, adversa.ai
Ramesh Raskar
Professor & Director, MIT Media Lab
Ron F. Del Rosario
VP-Head of AI Security, SAP
Tal Shapira
Co-Founder & CTO, Reco AI
Akram Sheriff
Senior AI/ML Software Engineering Leader, Cisco
Samantha Siau
Security and Compliance, Anthropic
Kevin Simmonds
Partner on AI Offensive Security, PWC
Martin Stanley
NIST AI RMF Lead, Independent
Omar A. Turner
General Manager of Security, Microsoft
Apostol Vassilev
AI Research Team Supervisor, NIST
Matthew Versaggi
AI Fellow, White House Presidential Innovation Fellow
David Webb
Agency Cybersecurity Officer, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Dennis Xu
Research VP, AI, Gartner
Xiaochen Zhang
Executive Director and Chief Responsible AI Officer, AI 2030
Recognition
We extend our gratitude to all founding members who have contributed to establishing this crucial framework for AI security assessment. Their vision and dedication have been instrumental in shaping the Agentic Skills Top 10 project.
Get Involved
Interested in contributing to the Agentic Skills Top 10 project? We welcome new contributors and leaders. Please see our Contribution Guidelines for more information on how to get involved.