OWASP Embedded Application Security
You do not have to be a security expert in order to contribute!
Some of the ways you can help:
- Technical editing
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- Code snippets in your favorite language
- Translate guidance material
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Alternatively, clone the Github repo, use your favorite markdown editor, apply/make your edits, and submit a pull request. Feel free to contact the project leaders for ways to get involved.
Any contributions to the guide itself should be made via the [guide’s project repo] (https://scriptingxss.gitbook.io/embedded-appsec-best-practices/.
Made possible by contributions from:
Jim Manico Benjamin Samuels Janet Kulp
For the most up to date best practices document, please visit https://scriptingxss.gitbooks.io/embedded-appsec-best-practices/
Embedded Best Practices
Embedded Top 10 Best Practices
E1 – Buffer and Stack Overflow Protection
Prevent the use of known dangerous functions and APIs in effort to protect against memory-corruption vulnerabilities within firmware. (e.g. Use of unsafe C functions - strcat, strcpy, sprintf, scanf) Memory-corruption vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows, can consist of overflowing the stack (Stack overflow) or overflowing the heap (Heap overflow). For simplicity purposes, this document does not distinguish between these two types of vulnerabilities. In the event a buffer overflow has been detected and exploited by an attacker, the instruction pointer register is overwritten to execute the arbitrary malicious code provided by the attacker.
E2 – Injection Prevention
E3 – Firmware Updates and Cryptographic Signatures
Ensure robust update mechanisms utilize cryptographically signed firmware images upon download and when applicable, for updating functions pertaining to third party software. Cryptographic signature allows for verification that files have not been modified or otherwise tampered with since the developer created and signed them. The signing and verification process uses public-key cryptography and it is difficult to forge a digital signature (e.g. PGP signature) without first gaining access to the private key. In the event a private key is compromised, developers of the software must revoke the compromised key and will need to re-sign all previous firmware releases with the new key.
E4 – Securing Sensitive Information
Do not hardcode secrets such as passwords, usernames, tokens, private keys or similar variants into firmware release images. This also includes the storage of sensitive data that is written to disk. If hardware security element (SE) or Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is available, it is recommended to utilize such features for storing sensitive data. Otherwise, use of strong cryptography should be evaluated to protect the data. If possible, all sensitive data in clear-text should be ephemeral by nature and reside in a volatile memory only.
E5 – Identity Management
User accounts within an embedded device should not be static in nature. Features that allow separation of user accounts for internal web management, internal console access, as well as remote web management and remote console access should be available to prevent automated malicious attacks.
E6 – Embedded Framework and C-Based Hardening
Limit BusyBox, embedded frameworks, and toolchains to only those libraries and functions being used when configuring firmware builds. Embedded Linux build systems such as Buildroot, Yocto and others typically perform this task. Removal of known insecure libraries and protocols such as Telnet not only minimize attack entry points in firmware builds, but also provide a secure-by-design approach to building software in efforts to thwart potential security threats.
E7 – Usage of Debug Code and Interfaces
It is important to ensure all unnecessary pre-production build code, as well as dead and unused code, has been removed prior to firmware release to all market segments. This includes but is not limited to potential backdoor code and root privilege accounts that may have been left by parties such as Original Design Manufacturers (ODM) and Third-Party contractors. Typically this falls in scope for Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) to perform via reverse engineering of binaries. This should also require ODMs to sign Master Service Agreements (MSA) insuring that either no backdoor code is included and that all code has been reviewed for software security vulnerabilities holding all Third-Party developers accountable for devices that are mass deployed into the market.
E8 – Transport Layer Security
Ensure all methods of communication are utilizing industry standard encryption configurations for TLS. The use of TLS ensures that all data remains confidential and untampered with while in transit. Utilize free certificate authority services such as Let’s Encrypt if the embedded device utilizes domain names.
E9 – Data collection Usage and Storage - Privacy
It is critical to limit the collection, storage, and sharing of both personally identifiable information (PII) as well as sensitive personal information (SPI). Leaked information such as Social Security Numbers can lead to customers being compromised which could have legal repercussions for manufacturers. If information of this nature must be gathered, it is important to follow the concepts of Privacy-by-Design.
E10 – Third Party Code and Components
Following setup of the toolchain, it is important to ensure that the kernel, software packages, and third party libraries are updated to protect against publicly known vulnerabilities. Software such as Rompager or embedded build tools such as Buildroot should be checked against vulnerability databases as well as their ChangeLogs to determine when and if an update is needed. It is important to note this process should be tested by developers and/or QA teams prior to release builds as updates to embedded systems can cause issues with the operations of those systems. Embedded projects should maintain a “Bill of Materials” of the third party and open source software included in its firmware images. This Bill of Materials should be checked to confirm that none of the third party software included has any unpatched vulnerabilities. Up to date vulnerability information may be found through the National Vulnerability Database or Open Hub.
Embedded Device Firmware Analysis Tools
Over the years, embedded security hardware and software tools have been introduced. Some free, some commercially based. If the lists below are missing tools from your arsenal, please feel free to add them.
- JTagulator 1
- UART to USB
- Shikra 2
- TTL RS323
- C232HM Cable
- JTAG Adapters
- CPLDs (in lieu of FPGAs)
- Multimeter (Ammeter, Voltmeter, etc)
- Logic Analyzers 3
- GreatFET 4
- Solder station
- Hot air rework gun
Introductory Embedded Section
- [ ] Layout of firmware for embedded linux, RTOS, and Embedded Window
Expand on embedded best practices
- [ ] Secure boot recommendations
- [x] U-boot
- [ ] Break out subsections for each of the platforms with contextual guidance and configurations
- [ ] Expand on hardening for:
- [ ] Embedded Linux
- [ ] RTOS (QNX/MQX)
- [ ] Best practices/considerations for PKI in embedded systems
Create example embedded application security requirements for new products
- [ ] Integrate with ASVS or create an EASVS (Embedded Application Security Verification Standard)
Join the mailing list, slack channel (#embeddedappsec) and contact the Project leaders if you feel you can contribute.